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SOCIOLOGY OF THE RENAISSANCE

by
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LONDON

KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER & CO., LTD.
BROADWAY HOUSE : 68-74 CARTER LANE, E.C.4

SOZIOLOGIE DER RENAISSANCE

First published in Germany, 1932

SOCIOLOGY OF THE RENAISSANCE

translated from the German by W. L. LUETKENS

First published in England, 1944

Reprinted . . . March, 1945

**THIS BOOK IS PRODUCED IN COMPLETE
CONFORMITY WITH THE AUTHORIZED
ECONOMY STANDARDS**

Printed in Great Britain by Butler & Tanner Ltd., Frome and London

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

The present essay was originally conceived in answer to a request from the sociologist Alfred Vierkandt of Berlin University, asking me to write the articles on the Middle Ages and the Renaissance for his *Handwörterbuch der Soziologie*. The latter article in particular assumed proportions which made it necessary to omit considerable parts in the Encyclopedia, among them the chapters dealing with the relationships obtaining between the capitalist propertied classes and the humanist intelligentsia. In order to give due attention to this particular question, the present author dealt with it in an article in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft*. Neither the contribution to the Encyclopedia nor the article were more than fragments of the whole ; my desire to publish the work in its entirety was encouraged by the fact that so far no attempt has ever been made to give a complete sociological analysis from every historical aspect of a self-contained historical period. That is to say, incidentally, that this work may hope to be accorded that indulgence to which every pioneer effort is entitled.

A number of objections may be raised at once, and they all arise from this fundamental question : what is the purpose of sociological interpretation ? It cannot dispense with the concept of the ideal type which was evolved by Max Weber, who remains the greatest German sociologist and was at the same time an erudite historian. To be sure, not only the sociologist but also the historian cannot forgo this concept as soon as the division into periods is more to him than a matter of practical convenience, and involves the fundamental query of his work : the question as to the spirit, the essence of a period, for example, the essence of the Renaissance or the Middle Ages. The answer to the sociological question, which must always concern itself with the social conditioning and the social function of the spirit of an age, is that it is determined by the economic, political and cultural ruling class. It analyses the civilization under review, laying bare its roots.

The present author has chosen these guiding lines in his approach to the Renaissance (a period with which he is familiar through studies in cultural and intellectual history extending

over a period of years) ; he has attempted to demonstrate what is sociologically typical in all its aspects. He was thus forced to focus attention on those facets of the period which most clearly demonstrate its bourgeois and specifically modern side. Seeing that at bottom the Renaissance is an Italian phenomenon, just as the Middle Ages and the genuine Romantic Revival were German and the Age of Reason West European, the limitation of this study to Italy was fairly obviously indicated. Furthermore, a typological preference for the bourgeois metropolis of Florence was in place, following Karl Brandi, who in his short but excellent book on the Renaissance also takes its history, together with that of Rome, as being characteristic of the times. In spite of these limitations, or rather on account of the nature of the selection made, the author believes that the present sociological analysis can lead to certain conclusions about the bourgeoisie as such : it can reveal the essence of the bourgeoisie as manifested in the first modern civilization created by it, by showing what parts of it were typical. It was the author's aim by this sociological study of the Renaissance to come to conclusions which go beyond the explanation of a completed historical process of the past, and which are relevant for the understanding of all bourgeois culture, including that of our own time. It is for this reason that mediaeval aspects have been excluded, though they were of course still very prominent during the Renaissance : no period can conceal its origins any more than a man can. Thus static and traditionalist elements which remained by way of obstruction in the era of early capitalism receive passing notice at best.

If this essay speaks of a social and cultural development leading from the Early to the Full and lastly to the Late Renaissance, this is not intended in the purely chronological and genetic sense of the historian. It is purely sociological and the intention is to plot certain rhythms which arise from the structural type of bourgeois civilization. The terms Early or Late Renaissance are but the milestones of an ideally typical development, corresponding to the psychology of the bourgeoisie in its different generations. Which psychological state is dominant at any time depends upon what stage social developments have reached, upon whether the bourgeoisie is still rising or whether it has reached or even passed the zenith of its course.

Seeing that the task of the essay is one of sociological analysis and synthesis and not of the presentation of historical material, footnote references have been restricted to a bare minimum. By way of bibliographical reference it need only be said that the present author is convinced that J. Burckhardt's outstanding work is by no means obsolete. But it must be supplemented by modern contributions to the history of early capitalism, a field of study where Sombart remains supreme, especially as he devotes some attention to the intellectual history of modern economic man. Eberhard Gothein is known as a student of cultural history with sociological interests: his *Kulturentwicklung Südtaliens* may be mentioned here. A. Doren's *Florentiner Tuchwollenindustrie* offers more material than the title, suggestive of pure economic history, would indicate. F. Engel Jánosi's work (published in 1924) (1) is useful as a collection of material bearing on the social ideology of the Renaissance. Some observations which are of importance for the sociological understanding of the Renaissance may be found in Simmel's *Philosophie des Geldes* and in Scheler's treatises on the sociology of knowledge (*Wissenssoziologie*) (2).

As a rule the Renaissance is studied as a period of fine art and great intellects; this essay attempts to go behind these outward forms. It analyses the social realities which gave rise to this culture, in particular that class of "property and intellect" (*Bildung*) which here makes its first appearance in modern history; property is considered before the intellect, and in both cases the fateful intermediate position of this *haute bourgeoisie* between the aristocracy and the lower orders, the middle class and the proletariat has to be brought out. The cultural consequences of this intermediate position had to be traced through all the transformations which this society underwent in the process of its rise and decline. This begins with the new impulses which the emerging bourgeoisie transmitted to all spheres of life and leads first to the cultural heights which were thus achieved and then down again to the point where the democratic régime which the *haute bourgeoisie* controlled entered upon its crisis and came to the verge of bankruptcy, a position which the contemporary Machiavelli clearly diagnosed from a proto-Fascist point of view.

The fact that the aristocracy and the clergy remained such great powers that the Third Estate voluntarily adjusted and

assimilated itself to them, with the result that it was again held back, constitutes a special characteristic of the first modern bourgeois epoch. As a matter of fact, this phenomenon is by no means confined to this specific period alone. Actually, it is not intended here to write only about a past which is dead and done with. Only if the reader is made conscious of this, will the book have fulfilled its avowed object.

INTRODUCTION

Inertia and motion, static and dynamic are fundamental categories with which to begin a sociological approach to history. It must be said, though, that history knows inertia in a relative sense only : the decisive question is whether inertia or change predominates.

The centre of gravity of mediaeval society was the land, was the soil. With the Renaissance the economic and thus the social emphasis moves into the town : from the conservative to the liberal, for the town is a changeable and changing element. Mediaeval society was founded upon a static order of Estates, sanctioned by the Church. Everyone was assigned to his place by nature, i.e. by God himself, and any attempt to break away from it was a revolt against the divine order. Everyone was confined within strictly defined limits, which were imposed and enforced by the ruling Estates, the clergy and the feudal nobility. The King himself was bound to rule according to definite laws : he had to carry out his reciprocal obligations towards his vassals ; he had to treat the Church according to the principles of *justitia*. Otherwise his vassals had a right of rebellion, and the Church denounced him who had strayed from his assigned position as a *tyrannus*. The burgher could be fitted into this order by the Church so long as he remained the modest middle-class man, who saw himself as a part of the established order, living in the mediaeval town which was still based upon a primary economy and a conservative scheme of things. Even in Renaissance Italy this *petite bourgeoisie* had its outlook closely circumscribed by such an order of society (1). But, as the burghers became a power with the rise of a money economy, as the small artisan became the great merchant, we find a gradual emancipation from the traditional forms of society and the mediaeval outlook : there was a revolt against those sections of society which were most dependent upon this structure and upon these ways of thought, by virtue of which they exercised their authority. We find arising against the privileged clergy and the feudal nobility the bourgeoisie, which was throwing off their tutelage and emerging on the twin props of money and intellect as a bourgeoisie of " liberal "

character. By revolting against the old domination they also freed themselves from the old community ties which had been interlinked with it. Blood, tradition and group feeling had been the basis of the community relationships as well as of the old domination. The democratic and urban spirit was destroying the old social forms and the "natural" and accepted divine order. It thus became necessary to order the world starting from the individual and to shape it, as it were, like a work of art. The guiding rules in this task accorded with those liberal aims set by the constructive will of the bourgeoisie.

Life in a primary community is apt to produce a conservative type of thought, a religious way of thought which orders the world in an authoritarian manner. Everything temporal is to it no more than a parable, a symbol of the metaphysical, and nature is but a reflection of the transcendental. But the bourgeois world as seen from the coolly calculating, realist point of view of the city state is a world that has lost its magic. The liberal mode of thought of the emancipated individual attempts to control the outside world more and more consciously. Thus community becomes society, and thus arises the new domination by a new oligarchy, the capitalist domination by the moneyed great bourgeoisie, which exploits those "democratic" tendencies which had destroyed feudalism, as the best way to ensure its own domination. In the Middle Ages political power with religious sanction had prevailed: now comes the era of an intellectually supported economic power. Religion as well as politics becomes a means, just as previously commerce and secular culture had been no more than the means to an end.

The Middle Ages in their social structure as well as in their thought had a rigidly graduated system. There was a pyramid of Estates as well as a pyramid of values. Now these pyramids are about to be destroyed, and "free competition" is proclaimed as the law of nature. God and blood, the traditional powers, are deposed, and though they maintain some of their importance their dominance is shattered.

The spirit of capitalism which begins to rule the modern world with the Renaissance deprives the world of the divine element in order to make it more real. But the spirit of early capitalism did not as yet dehumanize it. Reason was not as yet rated above humanity; it was not yet the be-all and end-all

of all action. Riches were, as yet, no more than a means to independence, respect and fame (L. B. Alberti). Although time was beginning to become scarce, the individual could yet lead a cultured existence and see himself as a full personality. The culture of Renaissance Italy, and only Italy knew a genuine Renaissance, contained from the very beginning certain aristocratic elements and tended to emphasize them increasingly. It is significant that Italy led the way in the development of early, but by no means of full capitalism.

Thus the typological importance of the Renaissance is that it marks the first cultural and social breach between the Middle Ages and modern times : it is a typical early stage of the modern age. And the outstanding ideal type is the Italian situation, above all in Florence. Jakob Burckhardt could already write : "The Florentine was the model and prototype of the present-day Italian and of the modern European in general," and Pöhlmann said that we find in Florence "the most varied expression of the spirit of modern times to be seen anywhere at the end of the Middle Ages or within so confined an area" (2). The reasons for this advanced position of Italy, and above all of Florence, are to be found in political, constitutional, economic, social and educational history, as well as in the relations with the Church.

But for the sociologist the interest of the period lies in the fact that it presents him with the complete rhythmic progression of the ideal type of a cultural epoch dominated by the bourgeoisie. The differentiation of Early, Full and Late Renaissance, originally devised by the art critic, finds its sociological meaning in those social changes which are expressed in the stylistic ones. The prelude to the bourgeois era which we call the Renaissance begins in the spirit of democracy and ends in the spirit of the court. The first phase represents the rise of a few above the rest. This is followed by the securing of their newly won exalted position and the attempt to establish relations with the feudal aristocracy and to adopt their way of life. From the very beginning, that part of the bourgeoisie which gave its character to the period, i.e. the capitalist entrepreneurs, feels itself called upon to rule. In order to achieve this end it must first eliminate the former rulers on its "Right" by making an alliance with the "Left". But from the very beginning it has a tendency

towards the "Right"; a tendency to intermix with the traditional ruling classes, to adopt their way of life, their attitude and their mode of thought and to attempt to become part of feudal "good" society.

The humanists—representatives of the intelligentsia—follow the same road and feel themselves tied to the new élite; whether this attachment was voluntary or no is of secondary importance here. Under the circumstances "democracy" meant no more than opposition to the privileges of the old powers, the clergy and the feudal nobility; hence the negation of those values which served to uphold their special position; it meant a new, bourgeois principle of selection according to purely individual criteria and not according to birth and rank. But liberty was not made into a revolutionary principle symbolizing an onslaught upon all and every established authority. In particular the Church was respected as an authoritative institution, and the only aim of the bourgeoisie was to vindicate its right to a position of importance. "A complete self-disarmament, such as the upper Estates carried through before the Revolution in France under the influence of Rousseau, was out of the question among these utilitarian Italians" (F. G. J. von Bezold). This bourgeoisie of the Renaissance had a strong sense of what would enhance its power; its rationalism served it without ever endangering its position.

I

THE NEW DYNAMIC

(a) *CHANGES IN SOCIAL STRUCTURE*

“Italy, always delighting in a new thing, has lost all stability . . . ; a servant may easily become a king.” It was the new power of money that made Aeneas Sylvius say this, a power which changes and sets in motion. For it is a part of the “power of money to subject all walks of life to its tempo” (Simmel). In an era of primary economy the individual was immediately dependent upon the group and the interchange of services linked him closely to the community ; but now money makes the individual independent because, unlike the soil, it gives mobility. “Cash payments” are now “the tie between people” (Lujo Brentano) ; the relationship between employer and employed is based upon a free contract, with each party to it determined to secure the utmost advantage. At the stage of development represented by a primary economy human and personal relationships predominated ; a money economy makes all these relationships more objective.

Authority and tradition were able to dominate the mediaeval economy because of the methods of the self-sufficient, individual undertaking ; but the resulting limitations become unbearable when the economic system of segregated small or medium-sized units is replaced by capitalist enterprises pointing the way to the factory system, and when industry begins to produce for a larger market, the world market in fact.

Now competition becomes a serious factor, whereas the essence of the guild organization, with its price fixing and compulsory corporization, had been the elimination of competition. In those days the individual had been unfree but secure—as in a family. But for obvious reasons, that had been possible only in an economy designed to satisfy immediate and local needs. Even the professional trader had been able to maintain the characteristics of the artisan owing to his unchanging methods and life. As long as the horizon remained comparatively limited all this was possible, but as soon as the horizon expands, as

great money fortunes are accumulated (in the Middle Ages fortunes consisted solely of land), these conditions are bound to disappear. The great merchants and moneyed men regard the rules of the guild as so many fetters, and they know how to rid themselves of them. In Florence they free themselves from the restrictions of the guilds and achieve individual freedom to carry on trade and commerce, thus freeing themselves from all the mediaeval barriers against the rise of a class of real entrepreneurs. The individualist spirit of early capitalism thus replaces the corporate spirit of the mediaeval burgher.

The Florentine development was both typical and the first in point of time. The townspeople of the Middle Ages were "essentially similar and economically independent individuals" (Doren); all this was fundamentally altered by the increasing power of mobile capital. In step with the industrial developments we find radical alterations in the social structure, for now an élite of capitalists was forming itself; it no longer took part in manual work, but was active in the sphere of organization and management, standing apart from the remainder of the middle class and the working proletariat. The wage-earners—excluded from the possession of the means of production and from all political rights—were ruthlessly exploited and even deprived of the right of association. But the mercantile and industrial capitalist elements also asserted their power over the master craftsmen, the *popolo grasso* of the *arti maggiori* over the *popolo minuto* of the *arti minori*. And it was the great merchants, leading the *arti maggiori*, who in 1293 made the guild organization into the basis of the Florentine constitution. Only formally speaking was this a victory of a broad middle-class democracy (cf. Davidsohn). Not the "people", but the monetary power of the upper guilds defeated the feudal aristocracy, and the middle class represented by the lower guilds was for all intents and purposes excluded from power. The Florentine constitution of 1293 gave power to a selected plutocracy. The "rule of the people" remained an ideological façade, a slogan for the masses. It was designed to tie them to the new rulers, and deck out as the rule of justice the new form of government which degraded and deprived of political rights the whole feudal class. The struggle against the feudal aristocracy was the first trial of strength of the *haute bourgeoisie*,

in which it needed the support of the middle and small bourgeoisie.

It is true to say that feudalism had never been fully established in Italy, yet even Florence had a mediaeval constitution which had to be destroyed. Eberhard Gothein, in his *Renaissance in Südtalien*, shows to how small an extent the legislation even of a Frederick II had destroyed feudalism in southern Italy, and how it was systematically re-established in Renaissance Naples. But on the other hand, he also shows how largely it had become "an empty form, a lie" even there; how much a "fiction" and a "disguise" which no longer corresponded to reality. "The spirit of ruler and ruled alike had long since outgrown the ideas of feudalism"; "these forms of tenure, deprived of their pristine meaning", had become fictitious. The primacy of the old rulers had corresponded to their military importance, the importance of the heavy cavalry of the vassal and his followers. In the measure in which the infantry, the weapon of the burghers, acquired increasing and then overwhelming tactical importance, the nobility was bound to take a place of secondary rank even in its very own military sphere. But the same was true of economic and cultural trends: the nobility was no longer at home in an era of reason. Even though the nobility had—before the bourgeois—fought against the Church as the sole arbiter of conscience, it was now deprived of the basis of its power—the monopoly in military matters and the link of wealth with landed property. It stood, senile and outlived, in the midst of a new era. Even its respect for "honour" was anachronistic; one remembers Vespasiano da Bisticci's story of King Alfonso's impulsive refusal to destroy the Genoese fleet by purely technical means, because it seemed unchivalrous to do so. Such scruples were bound to appear as old-fashioned, aristocratic prejudices to an era which rationally shaped its means to serve its ends, and reckoned only the chances of success. Against an ideology which bases its power upon an empty legitimacy, which is therefore felt to be false, against such an ideology the realistic bourgeois stakes the reality of power, for it alone impresses him, whereas its absence appears contemptible. But the basis of power in a money economy is twofold: (a) the possession of money and (b) an orderly management of business. Giovanni Villani (1) believes that the dis-

orderly management of their resources by the (Teutonic) feudal nobility forced them to satisfy their need for money by arbitrary means such as violence and faithlessness. It is part of the self-respect of the great bourgeois that he, a good merchant, has no need of such methods, for economic reason gives him a way of calculating correctly ; it is here that he sees the superiority of his civilization, the civilization of the towns.

The mediaeval system knew in the field of economics only one type of order, the order of the small men, peasants and artisans, who by the work of their hands earned their keep, in accordance with the necessities of their rank, their traditionally fixed "needs". Apart from this static order, which applied to the vast majority, there was the static disorder in which the great lords, the rich of pre-capitalist days, led their particular lives. It did not matter whether they were secular magnates or among those priests who, according to Alberti, desired to outdo all in splendour and display, in inclination to inactivity and the absence of all economy. As a matter of fact, such an unregulated and indolent mode of life led to the economic ruin of the majority of the old noble families. In contradistinction to the nobleman as well as the mediaeval peasant or artisan, the bourgeois entrepreneur calculates ; he thinks rationally, not traditionally ; he does not desire the static (i.e. he does not acquiesce in the customary and the traditional) or the disorderly but the dynamic (i.e. he is impelled towards something new) and the orderly. He calculates, and his calculations take the long-term view. All sentiment (such as the peasant's love for his own or the pride that the artisan takes in his handiwork) is foreign to him. What he values is the drive and discipline of work, directed single-mindedly towards an end. It is this that produces order as a human work of art.

But characteristic of the Renaissance is a far-reaching assimilation of the nobility to the new conditions and the reception of the nobles in the towns. The country nobility, in so far as it is not destroyed by "chivalrous feuds and extravagance, settles in the town" (2) and takes up commercial activities. It thus wins for itself wealth, and upon that basis a new political power ; in the process it becomes bourgeois in its nature, attitude and modes of thought, so that the bourgeois is no longer determined by his ancestry. This type of noble intermarries with the great

patrician families and together with them forms an exclusive aristocracy of commerce. This process is accelerated by the inclination of those families which are not noble to invest their industrial and commercial profits in land. This is done in the interest of the prestige of their firm and their own social standing, perhaps after they have ruined the original noble owners. It leads to a complete reconstitution of "good society"; it is a new aristocracy of talent and determination (in place of birth and rank), which begins by combining economic with political and military prowess, but whose mode of life is on the whole determined by the economic, i.e. the bourgeois, element.

(b) *THE NEW INDIVIDUALIST ENTREPRENEUR*

In acquiring power and social standing through wealth, the financially powerful bourgeoisie had thus become superior to the nobility, even in politics. What was fundamentally new was the rational management of money and the investment of capital. Capital had a creative effect and put a premium on ingenuity and enterprise. In the Middle Ages, a period of predominantly agricultural production, interest had centred upon consumption; after all, it is relatively impossible either to lose or increase landed property, which is essentially static. Only money, in the form of productive capital, creates the unlimited openings which emphasize the problem of acquisition as against that of consumption. With this growth in scope came the desire to exploit it: the enlargement of business increased the will and the ability to overcome the problems involved (1). The stability of an as yet static economy was upset by a dynamic element which increasingly and fundamentally altered its whole character. A progressive and expansive force was inherent in the new type of economic man and the new economy, a force which was to break up slowly but surely the old world of small economic units. Thus an economy of money and credit made possible the hitherto unknown spirit of enterprise in economic matters.

It became possible in quite a new sense to follow "enterprising" aims since they could be pursued by completely rational means, by the full exploitation of the possibilities inherent in a money economy. The rationally calculating foresight of the

merchant served to fashion in addition to the art of trade also the arts of statecraft and of war. The bourgeois, having gained his position of power, continued to press on and, in accordance with his psychology and will to power, appeared as a freely competing capitalist entrepreneur not only in commerce but also in political and military matters. It might be that he combined the functions of business magnate and political leader (as did the Medici, who relied upon their wealth and their position as party leaders), or he might, by capitalist methods, secure free disposal over a military force as a *condottiere* or over a subdued state as *nuovo principe*.

It is one of the traits of the early capitalist civilization of the Renaissance that business and politics became so thoroughly interdependent that it is impossible to separate the interests that they represented. We can see this clearly already in the case of Giovanni Villani. Business methods served political ends, political means served economic ends. Political and economic credit were already inseparable. The fame and the glory of a state (also increased by successful wars) were reflected in profits. On the other hand, we can already discern the difficulties brought about by the cosmopolitan character of the new power of money and the interlocking of international capital. Nevertheless, this obstacle to vigorous foreign policies was more than offset by the stimulus it gave to imperialist aims. The numerically small group of commercial and industrial magnates which at home had won political along with economic power, pursued in its external relations, too, a policy fashioned on broad lines—a policy of territorial expansion (such as the Florentine conquest of the ports of Pisa and Livorno, which was to benefit Florentine seaborne trade) or of winning new markets which was pursued “even at the price of internal unrest and without hesitating to conjure up war and its misery” (Doren). This may be contrasted with the more restricted policy of the *petit bourgeois*, the artisan, whose goal was a “bourgeois” existence and the “peaceful comfort of a small circle” (Doren). The entrepreneur, abroad as at home, was turning the state to his own ends.

But above all, the state itself was now becoming a capitalist entrepreneur ; the politician began to calculate and politics were becoming rational. Political decisions were influenced by com-

mercial motives, and politics were closely circumscribed by the categories of means and ends dictated by bourgeois aims and interests. We see politics pervaded by the spirit of reason, which had been alien to the mediaeval state at a time when the Church had been the one rationally guided institution. It is of minor importance whether the bourgeoisie democratically controlled the state or whether the bourgeois methods were adopted by an absolutist state in the shape of mercantilism and rational statecraft. In both cases realistic policy guided by economic considerations provided the contrast, typical of the age, with the practices of the Middle Ages, which had been sustained by the privileged Estates, the clergy and the feudal nobility. The attack upon these classes reveals a complete parallelism between the legislation of the first modern absolutist state, the realm of Frederick II in Lower Italy, and the Florentine *Ordinamenti della Giustizia*, where justice means, in a completely modern sense, the abolition of traditional privileges. In this way the modern monarchy and the formal democracy of a city-state fulfilled the same function: both were adequate to deal with the new social reality created by economic developments. These forms of government represented the two possible ways of adjusting the nature of the state to the nature of society. Accordingly, the Italian despotisms or *Signorie* continued along lines laid down by the town commune: both were built upon the foundation of the new money economy, the free development of individual forces and, on the other hand, the centralization of all power which increasingly substituted administrative for constitutional principles and subjected all spheres of life to conscious and rational regulation. The unifying factor was no longer an organic and communal one (e.g. blood relationship, neighbourhood or the relationships of service) but an artificial and mechanized social organization which cut adrift even from the old religious and moral power and proclaimed the *ratio status* as an expression of the secular nature of a state which was its own law. The resulting statecraft was "objective" and without prejudices, guided only by the needs of the situation and the desired end and consisting only of a pure calculation of power relationships. It was an entirely methodicized, objective and soulless craft and the system of a science and technique of state management.

The Norman state of Roger II showed already, at a very early date, the tendency towards bourgeois valuations, i.e. a spirit of sober calculation and the prominence given to ability and efficiency rather than to birth and rank. At the time of Roger's death Georgio Majo, the son of a Bari merchant who made big deals in oil, was High Chancellor of the Sicilian kingdom. Roger himself had already built up a professional civil service and sponsored a conscious economic policy (cf. his foundation of industries). Using these foundations, Frederick II loosened the old ties by limiting the rights of the Church and the feudal nobility in favour of a centralized organization which used fiscal and rational methods and employed a salaried bureaucracy and an army of mercenaries. Even the modern trait of basic distrust, of not trusting one's fellowmen—that characteristic of society as opposed to the community, which means traditional trust or confidence—which we later find in the urban communes, already characterized the régime of Frederick II: "the whole machinery of administration was so constructed that one section of it watched and controlled the others as much as was possible" (Ed. Winkelmann). And the enlightened despot knew how to exploit the magic position assigned to the mediaeval emperors as providing a prop for his rule and serving as an ideology to counter the papal theory of the two swords.

This Norman kingdom was in need of a rational basis in legislation and administration because it was a state built upon the might of the sword and the powerful personality (E. Caspar). It was for this reason that Burckhardt earlier pointed out its similarity to the *condottiere* states of the Quattrocento. These were "purely factual" structures relying on talent and virtuosity to assure their survival. In such an artificially created situation "only high personal ability" and carefully calculated conduct could master the perpetual menaces. In these states which lacked any traditional sanction the conception of the state as a task for conscious construction had to develop. And thus all depended upon the objective and correct attack upon this task by the proper constructor: to support this new objectivity the modern individual appeared. There was no distinction between the prince and the state: its power was his power, its weakness was his weakness. Therefore the "tyrant", himself the negation of the static mediaeval ideal of the *rex iustus*, has to be

judged by the historical and political criterion of "greatness" disregarding the criteria of morals and religion.

The prototype of the combination of the "spirit of enterprise" and the "bourgeois spirit", the two elements that Sombart distinguishes in the capitalist spirit, was the combination of war and business. We find it, even before the Crusades, in the Italian ports. "The warlike enterprises of the Italian sea-trading towns"—Pisa, Genoa, Venice—often "had the character of shareholding ventures", the share in the loot being distributed according to the extent of participation and whether it was only in the capacity of soldier or by the provision of capital (Lujo Brentano). And as a military profession at the disposal of the highest bidder developed, war became increasingly a matter of big business for the military entrepreneur, the *condottiere*, who "with the shrewd sense of a modern speculator changed sides and even fixed in advance the price of an expected victory" (v. Bezold), as well as for his employer. Stefano Porcaro debated before the Signoria at Florence whether it be "more profitable" to fight one's battles with a levy of citizens or with mercenaries, and he concluded that, in spite of the cost, it was "safer and more useful" to settle the business with money.

The Curia itself had to bow to the new trends which made for clearly circumscribed sovereignties forming the basis of financial power. The Vatican "was increasingly robbed of its economic basis in the shape of the powers of taxation of the Church Universal; after the Great Schism it had to create its own state as a necessary foundation" (Clemens Bauer): thus its monetary needs involved it in the internal Italian struggles.

(c) *NEW MODES OF THOUGHT*

The new mode of thought, evident in all these developments, naturally emanated from an upper class only. The middle class *petit bourgeois*, whose attitude we see in Vespasiano da Bisticci, remained essentially conservative. He still clung to a patriarchal order divided into estates of a static nature. He regarded as "just" the existing state of affairs, with which one should moreover remain content. Honest and straightforward, he took the view of a "good Christian and a good citizen". His simple

piety knew no problems ; he defended his faith as an absolute truth against the modern, liberal and intellectual belief that everything may be subjected to discussion : he was indignant with the " many unbelievers " who " dispute about the immortality of the soul as though it were a matter for discussion ", seeing that it was " almost madness to cast doubt on so great a matter in the face of the testimony of so many eminent men ". Here we see a way of thought that was traditional and tied to authority ; there is in it no individualist emancipation, so much so, in fact, that Vespasiano could regard a name as a " matter of indifference ". And yet this middle class was easily impressed and it bestowed its admiration where it could not really follow. It had to pay tribute to what impressed it and thus admitted, despite itself, valuations which ran counter to its own. Of course, it demanded that glory be not immorally acquired, but it also realized that the great, "*quegli che governano gli stati e che vogliono essere innanzi agli altri*", are not always able to keep to the rules of morality. And the Church itself at once came to the rescue ! What, after all, was the purpose of indulgences ? Infringements of the moral code could be expiated in money. So even the middle class made money the last instance, thanks to the lead given by the Church. On the other hand, almost anything, even noble descent, would impress this middle class, which had not yet won through to democratic consciousness. It felt at once the influence of a gentleman of noble birth, a "*signore di nobile stirpe e sangue*". It was impressed by anything outstanding, and it made no difference whether the distinction were military or literary, of ability, birth or wealth. In this context it is worth recalling Simmel's opinion : that when for the first time large accumulations of capital were concentrated in one hand and when the power of capital was as yet unknown to the great majority, " its influence was increased by the psychological effect of the unprecedented and the inexplicable " (1). By its very novelty, capital, when it first appeared as a force, acted upon a set of circumstances completely alien to it " like a magic and unpredictable power ". The lower classes were " bewildered by the acquisition of great wealth " and regarded its owners as " uncanny personalities ". Thus it was, for example, in the case of the Grimaldi and the Medici.

This admiration for the " demoniac " we also find in the

cult of *virtù*, of the man who was in any way great, which was rapidly spreading everywhere : this new type could achieve greatness only by boldly setting himself above all ethical and religious traditions and relying upon himself alone with frightening boldness. Traditional morality was outmoded : even a man such as Villani, though he would morally condemn those who lacked objective virtue, could admire subjective *virtù* in them, and in his appreciation of Castruccio Castracani anticipated Machiavelli himself. Christian ethics, inasmuch as they condemned *superbia*, the complete reliance upon one's own strength, though not rejected in theory, in practice lost all influence. The individual was conscious of the fact that he had to rely completely upon his own forces. And it was the superiority of *ratio* over tradition, brought about by a mercantile age, which gave him the requisite strength. Such a penetration of all activities by the cold and calculating attitude of the merchant easily achieved a demoniac character. It is well illustrated by an entry in the ledger of the Venetian Jacopo Loredano : "The Doge Foscari : my debtor for the death of my father and uncle." And when he had removed him together with his son we find the entry "paid" on the opposite page (2). We see the complete repression of impulse and the absolute control of the emotions by a ruthlessly calculating reason which inexorably moves to its goal. All this is the approach of a bourgeois age, an age of a money economy.

Money capital and mobile property naturally linked up with the kindred power of time for, seen from that particular point of view, time is money. Time is a great "liberal" power as opposed to the "conservative" power of space, the immobile soil. In the Middle Ages power belonged to him who owned the soil, the feudal lord ; but now Alberti could say that he who knew how to exploit money and time fully could make himself the master of all things : such are the new means to power of the bourgeois. Money and time imply motion : "there is no more apt symbol than money to show the dynamic character of this world : as soon as it lies idle it ceases to be money in the specific sense of the word . . . the function of money is to facilitate motion" (Simmel). Money, because it circulates, as landed property cannot, shows how everything became more mobile. Money which can change one thing into another

brought a tremendous amount of unrest into the world. The tempo of life was increased. Only now was formulated the new interpretation of time which saw it as a value, as something of utility. It was felt to be slipping away continuously—after the fourteenth century the clocks in the Italian cities struck all the twenty-four hours of the day. It was realized that time was always short and hence valuable, that one had to husband it and use it economically if one wanted to become the “master of all things”. Such an attitude had been unknown to the Middle Ages; to them time was plentiful and there was no need to look upon it as something precious. It became so only when regarded from the point of view of the individual who could think in terms of the time measured out to him. It was scarce simply on account of natural limitations, and so everything from now on had to move quickly. For example, it became necessary to build quickly, as the patron was now building for himself (3). In the Middle Ages it was possible to spend tens and even hundreds of years on the completion of one building—a cathedral, a town hall or a castle (e.g. the *Certosa di Pavia* which is built in the Gothic style): for life was the life of the community in which one generation quietly succeeds another. Men lived as part of an all-embracing unity and thus life lasted long beyond its natural span. Time could be expended just as possessions or human lives themselves were. For the Middle Ages knew a hand-to-mouth economy, as was natural in an age of primary production, for agricultural produce will not keep over long periods, and the accumulation of values was thus impossible. “Where the produce of the soil is immediately consumed, a certain liberality prevails in general . . . which is less natural when money brings the desire to save” (Simmel); money will keep indefinitely. Largesse was a mediaeval virtue; Bisticci could still praise the giving of any amount “without counting the cost” and with a “liberal hand” for the “love and greater glory of God” and according to “conscience”. But the splendid liberality of the Renaissance was of a totally different type. On principle it was bestowed only where it was “in place”. Alberti said that “contributions towards the erection of churches and public buildings are a duty that we owe to the honour of the family and of our ancestors”. Under such circumstances one gave no more than

was necessary, though always as much as was seemly. The reputation of the family which could not be separated from the credit of the firm had a rôle of its own in the thought of the merchant. *Onestà* called for certain expenditures, but they had to prove useful and not superfluous. It would not do to be pettifogging, but the rule to spend as little as possible is the natural corollary to the rule to gain as much as possible; here is the real meaning of the specifically bourgeois virtues. An orderly plan was the rule. To make headway it was necessary to spend less or at any rate no more than one's earnings, one must treat "economically" the body and the mind (Alberti regarded hygiene and sports as the way to strength and comeliness) and one must be industrious in contrast to the noble loafers. It was necessary to portion out time, even ration the time spent in political affairs. The Kingdom of Naples enforced over-frequent attendance at Church, and Caraccioli thought that though this might be "useful, it was most detrimental to a thorough exploitation of the day's time".

Furthermore, the merchant developed his own particular form of religiousness. The small artisan had an intimate and almost over-familiar attitude to God. The great bourgeois, on the other hand, faced him as a business partner. Giannozzo Manetti saw God as the "*maestro d'uno traffico*", circumspectly organizing the world on the analogy of a big firm. One could open a kind of account with him, as was easily suggested by the Roman Catholic emphasis on good works. Villani quite definitely regarded the giving of alms and the like as a way of securing almost by contract—the honouring of contracts is the highest virtue in the code of the honest merchant—the divine help, so that one may rely upon it. "*Ne deo quidem sine spe remunerationis servire fas est*" (Valla). Prosperity, according to Alberti, is the visible remuneration for an honest conduct of affairs pleasing to God: this is the true religious spirit of capitalism, and in a truly Roman Catholic way a kind of co-operation between grace and personal efficiency was assumed. But this "grace" was contractually due in return for one's own performance. Even religiousness became a matter for the calculation of advantages, part of a speculation designed to succeed in economic as well as political matters (cf. Villani).

The state of affairs, in fact, was that religion had ceased to

be a moving force on its own and had become part of the systematized outlook of the bourgeoisie, which was primarily determined by economic considerations. The religious idea was unable fully to penetrate human life and had ceased to cause effects of any magnitude. (The success of popular preachers of repentance was transient and sporadic.) The consciousness of belonging to a family of Western, Christian peoples, which in the Middle Ages had been upheld by knights and clergy, was alien to the bourgeoisie, taken up as it was with the feeling of national and political separations. Similarly, the class-conscious proletariat cannot recognize the bourgeois concept of the nation and the state. The living regard for Christendom or Europe taken as a whole died together with the belief in a divinely ordained duty to protect it against the infidel. The concept of a supra-national occidental community lost its meaning with the decline of those social groups which had upheld it. It now appeared outmoded and threadbare. Indeed, the idea was first abandoned by those who were called to uphold it more than anyone else, the Popes. Gregory IX and Innocent IV solicited Mahometan help against the Christian Emperor. Here too the Church, the one rational institution of the Middle Ages, had beaten the path which the Renaissance was to follow. The divers Italian states then grew accustomed to ally themselves with the Turk, "openly and unashamed" as Burckhardt has it, against the other Italian powers: "it seemed a political weapon like any other" (Burckhardt). Especially for the Italians the conception of Christian solidarity had lost all meaning; nowhere was there less dismay at the fall of Constantinople. On the contrary, an impressive personality such as Mahomet II was bound to be respected: Francesco Gonzaga, Marquess of Mantua, was prepared to address him as "friend and brother". If a Pope was asked to give aid against the Turks it was necessary to show "what advantages might accrue and what harm would be done if he were not to move" (4). It was a Pope, Alexander VI, who did his best, in concert with Ludovico il Moro, to turn the Turks against Venice.

Religion had lost its position as a power and its function as the common bond of all to the same extent as the ruling groups of the Middle Ages had been supplanted by the bourgeoisie. Similarly national languages began to supersede Latin, the

universal language of the clergy. Clerical demi-rationalism, i.e. the Thomist reconciliation of the natural and the supernatural, of the world and God, now led to complete rationalism. Religion was increasingly formalized, becoming a matter of outward observances (cf. the growing "judicial" character of religious beliefs). It was, in effect, neutralized and robbed of its hold upon life and the present. One did not go as far as to deny the theoretical possibility of divine interference by way of miracles : that was left to a later anti-theist enlightenment, which by the very intransigence of its protest showed its continued or renewed preoccupation with religious problems. The typical Italian of the Renaissance was already one step further : his was that genuine atheism which has eliminated the idea of divine power from the considerations governing his actions and indeed from his thoughts and writings (5). Men had ceased to believe that anything irrational might intentionally interfere to disturb their own systematic designs, they thought themselves able to master *fortuna* by *virtù*. This is also shown by the absolute position that humanists assigned to the free human will. It is true that the mediaeval Church had held the doctrine of free will in matters of morality, but it deliberately maintained the theological antinomy of free will and divine grace as a religious paradox. But now in this matter too, modes of thought tending towards complete individual freedom threw off the leadership of the Church.

Social conditions which had lacked a rational basis had already given way to a systematic order. Everyone had to rely upon himself in the knowledge that neither metaphysical concepts nor supra-individual forces of the community were backing him. No longer did anyone feel himself as a trustee in office or vocation. The one goal was that of being a *virtuoso* ; no considerations of contribution to the community, whether moral or religious, entered into this desire to be a master in one's own domain by utilizing all means calculated to achieve one's ends. Here, indeed, was a wholesale rationalization ; there no longer was a communal and irrational, positive attitude to certain values, because the organic structure of the past was in full decay. An organization of the world on rationally calculable principles was the order of the day.

(d) *THE BIRTH OF PRACTICAL LEARNING AND THE EXPERT*

Organization is based upon the conscious acts of individuals. But in order to act correctly the individual requires a knowledge of nature and its laws. Only when he possesses such knowledge can he master nature. Such practical learning is needed in order to work one's will. The ability to master the outside world gives the individual an opportunity of rise in the social scale. It is typical of the bourgeoisie and of the town and utterly alien to feudal and religious thought to believe that all things are possible and that the one necessary instrument is a rational technique.

The new technique in its widest sense, whose unlimited application constituted the new freedom of the individual, presupposed absolute laws of nature. And so, in the guise of the secular scientist, the bourgeois set about establishing the absoluteness of the laws of nature, which was required for his specific ends. The Middle Ages themselves had known the concept of laws of nature, but to them it was of secondary importance. In the semi-rational system of thought these laws were classed as *causae secundae*; above them was the metaphysical *causa primaria*, which thus constantly allowed for the possible interference of a divine miracle in the rational but secondary scheme of cause and effect. This latter, though it was ordained by God, was in fact always subject to interference. There was a supreme divine authority which disposed of the means of interference just as there was its representative on earth. The Church, i.e. the sacerdotal hierarchy, though it allowed secular life to go on according to its own laws, similarly reserved for itself a right of supreme control. This is no simple analogy in external appearances, but an inner, sociologically conditioned relation. It must of course not be understood in a vulgar materialist way as the conscious upholding of what was known to be a fiction in the interests of a social group, but as an unconscious formation of modes of thought by their indissoluble link with a particular set of social conditions. By analogy, the assignment of an absolute place to what had hitherto been *causae secundae* was the ideological reflection of the struggle for the emancipation of the bourgeoisie. This throwing off of clerical tutelage and this trend in ideas were one of its weapons, which was later adapted by the bourgeois engineer and technician to

an immediately practical end. The concept of an absolute law in nature—and also in politics such as Machiavelli attempted to evolve—served in the struggle for bourgeois free competition. The fact that despite this development the concept of the divine rule of the world was not simply denied, that in fact it was assigned a kind of seat of honour, that the possibility of miracles was not ruled out but simply and silently ignored, was but a concession to decorum and not an admission that such possibilities actually existed. It is exactly paralleled in the way in which the authority of the clergy and the Church was undermined but not directly attacked in polemic. It was regarded as “nonsensical” to enquire into “supra-natural things and things unseen” and “similar abyss-like mysteries”, as Guicciardini put it. Only “natural” causes were considered and metaphysics ceased to hold interest. The world with which men were fitting themselves to deal had become a world without God. He might conceivably exist somewhere, but he was no longer a part of the world of the living as the Middle Ages had believed. God had been removed to another distant sphere, and bourgeois secular thought everywhere based itself upon practical experience, be it in the natural sciences of Leonardo or in the statecraft of Machiavelli.

Seen by the light of bourgeois empiricism as opposed to the speculation of the cleric and the clerical philosopher, the relations of the individual to the cosmos took on a completely different form. The development was to lead through Giordano Bruno to Galileo, in fact to a completely secularized attitude to the world from which all irrationalism has been expunged. It is the attitude of a type of individualistic intellectual entrepreneur, which truly corresponded to the new capitalist attitude in economic matters. Simmel actually discerns a causal relationship to the money economy. “It is a money economy which for the first time created the ideal of exact numerical calculation”; the “mathematically exact interpretation of the cosmos” is the “theoretical counterpart of a money economy”. This method of interpreting the world by a number of mathematical equations, without regard for the natural limitations on life of which one thought oneself independent, this way of regarding the world as one big arithmetical problem with absolutely impersonal, abstract, interchangeable and measurable quantities, presents a

complete contrast to the more spontaneous and emotional attitude of the Middle Ages. Behind this attitude was the new will to power which it served, and which also contrasts with the completely different will to power prevalent in the previous age. In the Middle Ages this will had been predominantly political and directed towards the rule of men ; the desire for dominion over " territories and things " existed only as a means towards " dominion over men " (Scheler). Parallel to the feudal will to power ran that of the clergy, the other ruling group of the times. Together they founded a system of rule which, on the material side, was originally based upon military power, which had become traditional, and on the spiritual side was based upon religious tradition. But when the old ruling groups were replaced by the bourgeoisie, the will to power took on different forms. It was now economic and technical, directed towards a " productive transformation of material things " (Scheler). No longer was the domination of men the end ; man had become the instrument of domination. Only now we find the trend towards a thorough exploitation of human labour, which was declared " free " to this end. This was the great change from the Middle Ages, where every subordination implied the right to protection by one's lord. The new sciences and technical knowledge were the servants of the new will to economic power. Expressing as they did the new rational, liberal tendencies as opposed to the old conservative ones, they were also the immediate result of the new urge to intellectual power. The new money economy had given a new direction to the will to power, and a new kind of knowledge was ready to serve the bourgeoisie as a weapon in its struggle for emancipation and for power. Now, this quest for power took the form of a struggle for control over nature, based upon the understanding of its laws. In fact, even the new sciences were the outcome of the new spirit of enterprise, which was no longer prepared to put up with traditionally accepted but unexplained relationships of divine origin. It took all such relations to be capable of analysis by reason. This conception was applied not only theoretically to the methods of science, which now took nothing for granted, but also to the use of scientific knowledge. This was harnessed to immediately practical ends in the technical sciences which come easily to the bourgeois thinker, an engineer by nature. Knowledge was

pursued with the aim of interfering in natural processes ; one wanted to understand them in order to impose one's own power upon them. But only the new bourgeois, naturalist explanation of the world could give mastery over nature ; it thus served the social function of ministering to the rising social group, and hence became predominant.

On the other hand, as Dilthey has pointed out, the natural sciences themselves were furthered by their close contact with industrial production. The increasing practical needs which arose within bourgeois society, the new requirements of life, set problems which could be solved only by close co-operation between the practical worker and the scientific theorist, which expressed itself by experiment and calculation, by discovery and invention. The great scientists Ubaldi, Benedetti, Leonardo or Galileo set themselves tasks which arose from problems of navigation, shipbuilding or the construction of towns and fortifications. As firearms improved, war itself, which in the old days had been decided by cavalry battles, became increasingly a technical matter, and as artillery increased in importance, war became a task for the engineer. Men like Federigo of Urbino and Alfonso d'Este were representatives of the new type of military expert. We find a military science or art arising which subjected war to bourgeois influences. We find spectators who were not themselves involved " taking an objective pleasure in watching correct strategy for its own sake " (Burckhardt). There is an exact parallel to this in the equally rational science and technique of politics, which called for a *virtuoso* of calculating intellect and expert talent, as described by Machiavelli. Even the ideas of the Ancients—rediscovered by the humanists—were made to serve military and political practice. As has already been suggested, the rise of the exact sciences was made possible by the intermixture of two social groups which had been separate. The intellectuals constituted one of these groups—men of practical experience in the crafts and in industry the other. The interest of the latter was involved because they were given the chance of improving their own practically acquired knowledge as well as their own social position. In this way the theoretical and the practical, technical approach joined hands in a community of work which was quite different from the mediaeval community of erudition (cf. Scheler). The *homo religiosus* of the Middle

Ages had interpreted the world as a divine creation ; the bourgeoisie of the Renaissance saw it as an object for human work and foresight, for human ordering and fashioning. The urge to domination and management conditioned the aims and methods of the new sciences ; the investigation of nature, engineering and industry gave them their character.

(c) *NEW WAYS IN ART*

The new way of regarding the world as capable of being shaped into a work of art, as setting a task for rationally creative and independent minds, was bound to affect, next to the engineer, the artist, who only now began to rise from the artisan class. In fact, quite often the artist and the engineer were one and the same person, as in Michelangelo and, above all, Leonardo. But this new trend showed itself not only in men who combined artistic with technical gifts. Especially in the Early Renaissance even purely artistic work betokened an interest in technical matters. One might instance Castagno and Ucello and at a later period Signorelli, Mantegna and others. The conveying of an impression of depth by means of perspective appeared as a mathematical and scientific problem to the Italian of the Renaissance. For this reason perspective remained linear in Italian art and did not express itself in atmosphere as well, as in Dutch painting. To the romantically inclined German, as opposed to the bourgeois liberal Italian, perspective began as an experience of quasi-Faustian inspiration (1). According to Alberti the artist investigates nature and is above all a mathematician and engineer, for only knowledge thus gained will give him absolute mastery over his artistic media. Brunelleschi's cupola at Florence is a good example of combined artistic and scientific work.

In the course of this fusion the technical side was to a considerable extent pursued as an end in itself. The joy of discovery and experimenting almost got out of hand. But this seeking and investigating also proves the dynamic quality of the new art. The new vitality which had taken hold of life was drawing art into its vortex: "The more clearly the outside world is seen to be changing and the less the individual sees his own time as an organic continuation of the past, the more will the traditions

of a vocation be weakened and the more will men seek new methods" (E. Lederer) (2). So, the fundamental transformation of all conditions, the widespread emancipation from all that was traditional and the general broadening of the scope of personal ambitions were bound to bring about "an energetic development of artistic endeavour and the emergence of new problems in art". The creative impulse had to be brought to fruition by an entirely new consciousness in the artist: it was now that it became possible to talk of "genius" as the highest expression of a new consciousness, of its power and freedom which, based entirely upon the personal forces and ability of the individual, became possible only in a bourgeois world. In art as in economic organization the guild system, the communal structure, was in decay and making way for the new individualism.

The political structure proper to the bourgeoisie which had won its independence was the urban democracy, and hence the new art began by reflecting the new exalted position of the towns. This then gave rise to the bourgeois art combining sobriety with greatness, realism with majesty. Such monuments to bourgeois pride in Florence dating back to the turn of the thirteenth century were Santa Croce. Or S. Michele, the Bargello, the Palazzo Vecchio and, above all, the Duomo. This last was built by Giotto as municipal architect. In his hands art assumed a bourgeois character: to see this it is only necessary to compare his sober paintings with the solemn work of Cimabue which still reflected a profound religious attitude instead of simply representing religious subjects. The building of the Duomo was part of the public business of the Florentine Republic, and the citizens concerned themselves with all its details. In fact, public interest in it was quite as great as was the interest taken in great contemporary political events. Brunelleschi's brilliant plans for the cupola were sanctioned in the year in which the port of Livorno was conquered by Florence. The great artistic monuments to the sovereignty and fame of the city were seen as the symbols of the citizen's own elevation by the flowering of economic, political and cultural life. These great works, which had their counterpart also in Pisa, Orvieto, Siena and Venice, were "to the people an expression of its own aspirations, and the people felt themselves to be on common ground with the artist, who was not yet separated from them by a deep

rift" (R. Saitschick). In those days an interest in art was not yet the privileged possession of certain groups but was common to all. "It was generally accepted that a great work of art would reflect its glory upon the whole community" (Janitschek). This bourgeois art was in every respect popular: its subjects were predominantly religious in accordance with traditions which were but slowly abandoned. It thus took its departure from the relationship of the Church and the people which continued to exist. A further bourgeois and popular trait was a sense for the intimate, as in the work of Filippo Lippi or Domenico Ghirlandaio; this shows us a genial, natural, detailed and, as Wölfflin emphasized, a somewhat "vulgar" manner of presentation. The saints themselves appeared as *bons bourgeois*. Such an art was at the same time popular and imposing (the Duomo as the symbol of the city's greatness was intended to overshadow everything that had gone before), an art of which all could be proud and which yet remained close to the people, serving above all religious piety and remaining on common ground with them in the spectacles it offered. Such an art was able to appeal to the whole community, in spite of the fact that the political reality that it reflected was democratic in appearance only. Art, a field in which beautiful illusions have their rights, gave the people at any rate the feeling of a democracy, in particular as they found it more intelligible than points of high policy which remained difficult to grasp. The people gladly offered its thanks in public honours given to artists, particularly as it was able to honour men who had risen from its own ranks. On the occasion of Filippino Lippi's funeral all shops in the *Via de' Servi* at Florence were closed, a demonstration usually reserved for princes.

One of the most remarkable developments of bourgeois art was the appearance of the naked figure. This too had a sociological reason. Not only clerical but also aristocratic culture were opposed to the representation of the nude. "Nakedness, like death, is democratic" (Jul. Lange). The many pictures of the Dance of Death, products of the late and increasingly bourgeois Middle Ages, proclaim the equality of all in the face of death. But when the bourgeoisie ceased to regard itself as suppressed, when it became conscious of its own rise to power, it could through its artists place Man naked and himself in the

centre of life. There were to be no more differences of Estate, not only before God's throne but also in daily life (though the bourgeois will of course do nothing against the new class differences which were crystallizing). It was the influence of Antiquity which caused this particular form of artistic expression to be chosen, but this only demonstrates the sociological function fulfilled by humanism itself.

(f) *FUNCTIONS OF ERUDITION AND LEARNING*

The artistic cult of the nude as we find it in Signorelli may be compared to the concept of *humanitas* and, for instance, with Poggio's polemic against *nobilitas*. Humanism here represented an ideology which played a closely defined part in the bourgeoisie's struggle for emancipation and power. The concept of a "humanist" knowledge concerned with truths applicable to humanity in general, with an ethical system based upon personal *virtus* (i.e. the ability gained by an individual's own endeavour), implies the negation of all privileges based upon birth and Estate; it implies the negation of the belief in supra-natural powers which had been taught by the clergy, in favour of a "natural philosophy"; it means that what applied to the bourgeois was applied to humanity in general and was regarded as universally valid; it even means that new attacks might be made upon those positions which had until then been firmly held by the clergy. Such were the tendencies inherent in bourgeois "liberty" in the Renaissance as in later times, but as yet they needed a firm foundation which might be used with "authority." This function was fulfilled by classical antiquity. It is always the way of secular authority to base its claims upon the past, and the further back these claims go, the greater the authority. There is need for antiquity, for a model, i.e. "Classical" Antiquity. The traditions of mediaeval humanism (1) gave a starting-point for a new erudition, corresponding to the level attained by bourgeois culture, which wrested from the clergy its monopoly founded upon the theological orientation of mediaeval learning. The new ideal made its triumphant way, and Scholasticism was confined to the narrow bounds of clerical circles. In this removal of an antiquated and dead mode of thought—for the great days of Scholasticism were over and the

humanists fought but against its caricature—Antiquity, which had been raised to the new position of authority, did good service. Its “authority” was required to lend weight to the new bourgeois, secular culture, to give to its ideals the halo of age and to sanction and legitimize its aspirations. Of course the new authority was in no way comparable to the old. Although Antiquity appeared as the Golden Age which, led by nature, had recognized general and rational truths, Humanism was not prepared to oppose the dogma of the Church with a new secular dogma, as happened in the later days of the Age of Reason. This was prevented both by its instinctive fear of anything which might be genuinely revolutionary as well as by its spontaneous antipathy towards all systematization ; the latter was regarded as destructive of all vitality by its abstractions, a feature which the humanists hated above all else in Scholasticism. From the loathed abstractions humanism consciously struggled back to the concrete. This attitude was the expression of a desire for freedom, a loosening of all ties and a horror of everything that might again bind the individual and assign to him a strictly defined place. So even Antiquity was not made the basis of a uniform, as it were canonically binding philosophy—Platonism itself was no more than a matter for nostalgia and effusive yearning. Classical Antiquity was simply regarded as the noblest period of history. But the standing of even the most exemplary period of the past cannot be understood except in terms of what can be achieved in this world : the eminence of the model remained purely relative. According to the artist and the humanist himself, Classical Antiquity was no more than the finest period of history that had so far occurred. The implication of this was that his own time might be able to transcend it, that in fact some outstanding men had already reached its level and that the Middle Ages had only been the low tide between his day and that of the Greeks and Romans. The immediate past, the last remainders of the Middle Ages, were regarded as a lifeless and burdensome heritage, of which it was necessary to be rid before one could hope to win through to life. This was felt with the right of the living, for life is never just. And so it was possible to dismiss all Gothic art as the product of cultural decay. Conscious of the necessity of cutting adrift from a past which was not its own, purely in order to

breathe freely, the new bourgeois culture could regard the whole of Gothic art as no more than an aberration, and Vasari could say that Christianity had had a bad influence on art. The patron chosen for the new culture and a mighty ally in the struggle was the bourgeois culture of Antiquity. Armed with the soberly rational bourgeois attitude and with a critical intellect trained in classical studies, men dared to doubt many things which so far had been regarded as sacrosanct and had served to strengthen the position of the clergy. Already Petrarca had cast doubts upon the miracles of hagiography. Valla disproved the authenticity of the Donation of Constantine which had been protected by ecclesiastical authority; and as the reaction was anti-feudal as well as anti-clerical, critical attention was also given to the fabulous Romances of mediaeval literature. All these were episodes in the great offensive of the liberal bourgeoisie against a past which it regarded as a period of tutelage and a denial of its independence. On the other hand, especially in art and literature, a genuine competition (2) with classical times arose, proof enough of the relative nature of the eminence attributed to them. They were regarded as worthy of emulation and as showing the direction in which all effort should tend. An impulse was thus given in art, science and literature to the belief in the possibility of unlimited progress and the principle of free competition which comes naturally to a capitalist age. Science, which had been conservative in the Middle Ages, became liberal. The rivalry with what were so far the greatest achievements was to push one to yet greater ones, releasing the very maximum of ability and intellectual effort, an impulse which was even heightened by the belief that Ancient Rome was a part of one's own national past. The fame of one's own name, city and time provided an incentive, and a great consciousness of self was developed even in cultural and intellectual spheres. The humanist myth of the rebirth of Classical Antiquity was the wish-dream of a renewed national culture, bringing with it creativeness and vitality. The bourgeois always lives for the visible present which will allow of no encroachment either by claims of the transcendental as religious thought advances them or of the past as traditionalist thought does.

We have dealt so far in the main with the function of the subjective, psychological aspects of Humanism. But it is also

possible to assign a sociological meaning to certain of its objective aspects. Above all this is true of the canonization of reason, which linked up with Classic, and above all Stoic philosophy, best known from the writings of Cicero and Seneca. In Alberti, and especially also in Giovanni Rucellai, we see the Stoic law of nature, a natural because rational ethical system, re-interpreted in a manner characteristic of the times; it appeared here as the justification of capitalism. Reason was rated above the emotions in the interests of methodical self-discipline, and striving after wealth was represented as "wise" and "in accordance with nature", for the possession of wealth enables one more easily to live "by the precepts of reason" and hence virtuously. Roman law, spreading over Italy from the thirteenth century and incorporating ever since the days of the Roman Empire the Stoic concept of natural law, had actually prepared the way for economic individualism and egoism. Its fundamental assumption—which reminds one of Adam Smith, the Physiocrats and the Manchester school—was that the community is best served if every individual takes care of his own interests. From this it follows that it was equitable that there should be freedom of enterprise.

Lastly, we have to inquire what power the humanist idea had to bring men together. Its ability to create a community, to draw men into a brotherhood of ideas based on the acceptance of common values, must be rated very low. The Christian idea had been capable of creating an ever-growing community which, in the shape given to it by the mediaeval Church, had become a power great in intensity as well as in extent. If we look upon humanism as the modern counterpart of the Christian idea, its barrenness in a sociological sense is striking. Even in the sociological category of the "confraternity" ("*die soziologische Kategorie des Bundes*" (Schmalenbach)), it did not go beyond such small beginnings as the *Paradiso degli Alberti* (cf. Voigt) at Florence in the fourteenth century, the Platonic Academy of the fifteenth century and the various other academies of the fifteenth and fourteenth centuries. And if we investigate the relationships of the leading humanists, the members of the new group, the supposed bonds of friendship which did not even stand for a community of interests are best illustrated by the humanist literature of invective. Already at this early stage of

development of secular science in the West, we have good evidence to show that in no other group is individualism as prevalent as among professional academic men.

As long as learning was in the main upheld by the clergy—*ad maiorem Dei gloriam*—knowledge itself was regarded as a common possession. The mediaeval scholar tended to hide his own contributions behind tradition, in order to afford them its sanction. But now in a society with a heightened consciousness of the self and of property, matters of the mind too were affected by the idea of private property, bringing with it egoism and personal feelings, jealousy and rancour. Free competition soon led, in scientific as well as in economic matters, to the use of all available means. But this development of individualism in intellectual matters also threw up the phenomenon of the scientist who combined with the urge to seek an as yet undiscovered truth the satisfaction of his own intellectual needs and of his own personal ambition. The new spirit in polemic showed itself first in Petrarca's invective against the Averroists, to which he gave the whimsical title : "*De sui ipsius et aliorum ignorantia*". It is full of personal rivalries in marked contrast to similar mediaeval writings which always attacked an opponent as the protagonist of a system which was looked upon as fallacious or harmful.

(g) *THE PROPRTIED CLASSES AND THE INTELLIGENTSIA*

The protagonists of a secular culture were, as a new social group, in a difficult position within the whole structure of society. We can easily appreciate this if we envisage the tension between their social orientation towards the people and their intellectual orientation away from it. Especially as poets they were of the people, writing in the vulgar, i.e. the popular language ; but they differentiated themselves all the more sharply from it when, in the rôle of the intellectual élite, they wrote the esoteric new Classical Latin of the humanists. Similarly, among the artists, beginning with Masaccio and even Giotto, we find the rival tendencies of a democratic realism and an artistic stylization. Thus the humanists combined the ideology of *humanitas* which levels all differences of Estate with the raising up of *virtus* as the hall-mark of a new *nobilitas*. We find the identification of

intellectual *virtus*, i.e. erudition, with the humanist aristocracy of the *studium*. This followed from the new aloofness of the intellectual and the orator who felt that he possessed an erudition appropriate to his day and in fact valid for humanity in general, as well as a mastery of form (*sapientia et eloquentia*). In addition to wealth, erudition became the new principle of social selection.

Despite the cases of Count Pico della Mirandola and Michelangelo the great majority of the humanists as well as of the artists came from bourgeois families, as was to be expected in view of the urban character of the new culture. Both the *haute bourgeoisie* and the new intellectuals worked their way up from the economic middle class. In the urban atmosphere where birth and Estate were no longer decisive, and where personal prestige was increasingly important, intellectual eminence too might be the means of improving one's place in society, and could thus have far-reaching social consequences, such as the replacement of clerics by laymen in urban education, in scientific, literary and artistic work. But although the laity supplanted the clergy in these fields, they made little attempt to establish "downward" contacts. On the contrary, they desired to fill the vacant position of an intellectual élite and of leadership over the uneducated. Thus a new social rift opened, no less wide than the economic rift which was the result of capitalism. Not only did the New Learning give the humanists an immense feeling of their own superiority (characteristically this was personal rather than corporate), but it gave them the halo of a strange prestige in the eyes of the despised *πολλοι*. Classical learning was endowed with magic qualities similar to those attributed to the inexplicably rapidly acquired wealth of the capitalist, which appeared mysterious and almost sinister to a populace unable to understand how it had been won (1). In this way the people itself helped to make conscious the division between itself and the propertied and erudite classes (2).

Characteristic of and decisive for the structure of the intellectual élite was the diversity of its social origins. Petrarca, the first as well as the greatest of the humanists, began as an elegant young cleric at the Curia in Avignon. Boccaccio came from a family of merchants, and his patrimony gave him a life of moderate affluence. Until his father's death Niccolò Niccoli was active in trade, and Giannozzo Manetti was a banker's

bookkeeper until he retired from business to devote himself to "his studies and to politics". In Florence a sequence of Secretaries to the Ten from Salutati to Machiavelli, and including men like Bruni, Poggio and Marsuppini, were humanists. This last group secured its material backing—and by its very nature an intermediary class such as the intelligentsia needs some sort of support to safeguard its existence—in a way natural to a bourgeois who still felt the pull of local ties. But from the very beginning this type of humanist who preserved his local roots had a counterpart in men of Petrarca's kind. He represented a type of entirely independent humanist free intelligentsia; a type of independent *littérateur* free of the *πολις* and of *Realpolitik*, considering intellectual matters as an individual and purely literary affair, no longer at the service of the town community (3). The former still chimed in with the political system of a class which had come to power through economic advancement: they made the political attitude of this class their own and together with it proclaimed the bourgeois state and bourgeois patriotism. On the other hand, Petrarca had all the wilfulness of a man whose whole attitude centres around his personal genius, and in this he was in advance of his time. His humanism had severed all those ties which held it to a definite political and social reality; it had consciously torn loose from its roots in order to win through to that outer and inner independence which characterizes the genuine *littérateur*. Petrarca's mode of life, his continual wanderings, the unending restlessness which was his even in solitude, his craving for celebrity, his excessive self-consciousness as well as his relations with famous families and the courts of little despots, furnish us with a perfect example of the *littérateur's* existence. Hand in hand with the severing of all ties to the state went a detachment from society, i.e. bourgeois society. Already men like Petrarca, Boccaccio or Niccoli underwent that definite revulsion from bourgeois family life which we associate with the man of letters. Later on a type of libertinism developed in types such as Filelfo, which prompted Cino Rinuccini, a man of shrewd sociological understanding, to compare these humanist adventurers with the *condottieri*. And when the negation of all ties, apart from purely personal ones, went as far as to deny a husband all rights as against his wife's lover, as we find in Valla (4), the bourgeois business man could not

possibly follow, simply because to accept such views and to live according to such standards would dangerously impair his credit in the market. With the help of original sources these psychological economic interconnections have been clearly demonstrated by Sombart.

On the other hand, a community of interests developed between the capitalist *haute bourgeoisie* and the humanists. Every ruling class needs its retainers, and every rich class, in order to win prestige and prove its own eminence, must evolve the right measure of display. It must pay for its prestige, and the best method of display is to keep a suitable retinue. But this retinue must be differentiated from the retinue of those classes which one wants to displace. Accordingly the retinue of the new urban class was composed of representatives of the new urban intelligentsia. In their turn, these welcomed the new patronage not only for economic reasons but also for the sake of their own social position, and thus the interests of both parties concerned were served. In this way erudition became the new method of display and the men of learning provided the required retinues. But, with the looseness of all "liberal" human relationships, this one too was built upon a most insecure foundation. It arose as occasion demanded, no concrete ties were contracted and both parties retained their liberty of action. Devoid of security as was the existence of the political entrepreneur, the despot, just as irresponsible was the life of the *littérateur*. Conscious republicans such as Boccaccio and Salutati were still able to regard Petrarca's attendance at various courts as evidence of lack of personal character, but it is certain that neither he nor his patrons ever pledged loyalty to each other.

A certain continuity with aristocratic "affectations" was quite natural even in the Communes (e.g. in Florence), because here a strong influence had been exercised by trading nobles who had settled in the towns. In consequence a mode of life had developed which combined bourgeois elements with elements derived from this urbanized aristocracy. It was against such a background that display which resulted from increasing wealth took the "noble" form of intellectual and artistic culture. The aristocratic entrepreneurs, most active in politics as well as in commerce, dominated Florence for half a century after 1382, especially under the Albizzi. We have a good picture of the

more refined atmosphere prevailing among these urban aristocrats in the *Paradiso degli Alberti*. Antonio Alberti, the host, was a rich and noble merchant and the author of a volume of sonnets and *canzoni*. His companions were taken from all classes and conditions and from all sections of the intelligentsia. Thus a companionship in erudition evolved, which was later to be imitated by the Medici as well as at the other Italian courts. Among the "nobles themselves" we find "poets and linguists, thinkers and men of multifarious encyclopaedic interests . . . as well as rich patrons" (Voigt). The new type of dignity that we find described in Vespasiano's pages, which in a way represent "public opinion", required the highly placed to have a humanist education; the implication was always that it brought greater independence of mind and heightened critical insight, thus representing a productive investment. Galateo (5) stigmatized as the "mob" all those "who lacked erudition, however exalted their rank". This was of course aimed at the old style of aristocrat, who was noble only by birth. But, of course, and this is hardly surprising, an appreciation of intellectual matters should, so said the humanists, show itself in tangible form. They required liberal spending "*in usus honestos*"; only "well employed" riches brought good fortune, and the acquisition of wealth was justified only with this end in view. Alberti shows how much the bourgeois was inclined to save, when he described expenditure on books or on the decoration of a *loggia* as justifiable (compared with the reprehensible expenditure of feudal lords), but as in no way obligatory in the interests of family prestige, which was tantamount to that of the firm, and of bourgeois honour. But however strongly the humanists might object to a purely economic capitalism, uninterested in intellectual matters, it is significant that a man like Salutati, who continually vented these objections, should, when he was Secretary of the Signory at the time of the *Ciampi* revolt, distinctly cut himself off from what he called "*gens illa pauper et inops*". Faced with a revolutionary proletariat which he described as a *plebs* "*infida, mobilis et rerum novarum avida*", the bourgeois developed conservative inclinations; both Giovanni Villani and Salutati the humanist had no sympathy for the "mob".

The free *littérateur* Petrarca and the bourgeois humanist

Salutati both merely despised the "vulgar" mass, in which they included the ignorant mendicants. On the other front they actively struggled against the educated but scholastic reactionary clergy (cf. Salutati's exchanges with Giovanni Dominici) and the feudal nobility. This is Poggio Bracciolini's judgment of the latter: "The longer the line of bold miscreants from which a man traces his descent, the further is he removed from true nobility"; the passion for the chase, typical of this class, is to him a proof of its idleness and more bestial than human (6). The humanist ideal of an ennobled humanity, a humanity true to itself, was in this case clearly built on a bourgeois and democratic new *virtus* which demanded economic activity as a cultural necessity. The new ideology denied that feudal *nobilitas* contained aught of virtue and assigned nobility to the new *virtus*; thus on intellectual grounds a battle was waged which was concurrent with and parallel to the economic and political struggle of the bourgeoisie against the feudal nobility. Their economic ruin and their political disfranchisement was capped by the ideological assertion of their inferiority. The capitalist and the humanist united against the privileged classes, who barred the advance of the rising ones. The symbol of their alliance was the bourgeois symbol of work—be it economic activity or the *studium humanitatis*. Work was a form of *virtus* because it is the expression of personal achievement and independent of birth and rank.

Any politico-economic ruling class has a corresponding intellectual leading group, arising from the same social situation. The intellectual leading group supports the power position of the ruling class by the provision of an ideology and by guiding public opinion in the requisite direction. The function had been fulfilled in the Middle Ages by the clerical intellectuals; now it devolved upon the humanists. The former were the type of auxiliary required for rule by tradition, the latter were the pacemakers for a rational or "charismatic" rule. In a conservative world, based on static existence, religion was the adjunct of politics because of its emphatic upholding of tradition; equally, in a liberal world, stressing exclusively activity and achievement, science and work, which both aim at the expansion of existing scope, belong together. One age was relatively static, the other to a large degree dynamic and "progressive". In

the former an existing ruling class attempted to perpetuate its power and possessions ; in the other, forces and abilities which previously had been shackled were vigorously breaking out.

Blood, i.e. the privilege of birth, and the sacerdotal consecration had been the principles of selection of the mediaeval ruling class. The new criteria were those of wealth and erudition. Priest and feudal noble were displaced from their hegemony by the new economic power of money and the indirect beneficiary of the power of money, the independent intellect ; their place was taken by the alliance of bourgeois and humanist. Both were in direct opposition to the supra-rational modes of thought of the priest and the knight which ignored economic matters as well as the new intellectualism. Above all they swung away from that chivalry whose fundamental categories, courage and honour, ran directly counter to the calculating spirit of the bourgeois ; ecclesiastical thought, by nature more elastic, was able to become rational in the Renaissance, though it was forced largely to abandon its spiritual character. Money and talent were forced together in face of mediaeval tradition ; they met on common ground, as the typically bourgeois spirit of calculation and of rationally adapting means to ends are a characteristic of both the merchant and the intellectual : the new powers were akin in spirit as well as by choice. They were filled with the spirit of enterprise which produced similar attitudes, regardless of the fact that they applied it in the one case to economic and in the other to intellectual matters, two fields which have but little in common.

Simmel already pointed out this analogy of money and intellectualism. The common factor is motive energy and a powerful dynamic together with lack of tangible substance and independence of matter, liable to release "purely formal" energies which may be applied to any end. To acquire both money and intellect many different ways can be taken, and with their help many different goals may be reached. They thus become the centres of interest and the particular province of such social groups (and the individuals coming from them) as feel themselves at a disadvantage on account of their position in society : groups which feel oppressed and excluded from certain positions because the ruling group denies their right to occupy them. Thus the Jews were forced into finance in the

Middle Ages and by that means occasionally came to hold high office (e.g. in Arágon, where there were Jewish ministers of finance).

If such a thing was possible in the Middle Ages, the new epoch which was turning bourgeois in character was bound to offer unlimited opportunities to money, but also to intellect. For the Middle Ages were not ridden by limitations based on differences of Estate alone ; on the moral side too there were countless "irrational" limitations. But now it had become part of the rational character of money and intellect, part of their absolutely impersonal objectivity, that they recognized no such inhibitions. "The old inhibitions were decried as sentimental and ruthlessness became a positive rule of conduct." All this is typical of the *virtù* of the Renaissance as described by Machiavelli ; it is the uttermost employment of all potential forces and signals the disappearance of all emotional standards in face of a purely intellectual, arithmetical interpretation of the world. "The intellect as such is a-moral" (Simmel) : it is neutral like money which "lends itself without protest to the most dastardly machinations". So both begin by acting as a levelling influence : they create a level of "formal" equality for all. Pure intellect does not know the jealous exclusiveness which emotions and will foster in real life. But it is "exactly on the soil of equal rights for all that individual differences come to their fullest fruition and are most fully exploited", and by analogy pure intellectualism will bring about "practical egoism".

Money and intellect : these were the two great motive powers in the rise of those whose birth put them at a social disadvantage. "*Extolle te super homines !*"—already in the case of Salutati this was the real foundation of humanist study. A whole generation earlier Petrarca had known how to put this into practice, and later the ability or at any rate the will to stand out among men was common to all humanists. Aeneas Sylvius is responsible for its sharpest formulation : "Knowledge . . . which . . . causes the learned to stand out above the unlearned makes the former like unto God . . . even those of the most humble origin it lifts to the level of the greatest." It should be remembered that the humanists, or at any rate the greatest among them, at least in theory (though frequently not in their mode of life) consciously upheld definite values. But the inherent tendency of Humanism

—though not all humanists realized this—was characterized by the fact that already with Salutati the central concept of *virtus* began to lose its moral context and became increasingly formalized. More and more it came to mean intellectual *studium*, thus coming into line with the equally formal *virtù*, signifying initiative and ability, and all forms of dynamic striving by the individual.

The tendency towards the formalization of the intellectual ideal was further emphasized as *eloquentia* and *sapientia* were considered as qualities of equal value. Many humanists put their *eloquentia* to the use of influencing the opinions of educated men, and exploited their intellectual gifts without the slightest scruple. This was comparable to the worst kind of journalism and in some cases, witness Pietro Aretino, it was all but blackmail. He already represented the type of the “literary high-wayman” (v. Bezold); his one wish was to make money by selling or forcing others to buy his pen. Yet this cynic, this professional literary blackmailer, represented the last “refinement” of the type which was using its intellect for financial ends, the “philosopher of money”, tearing down the last barriers of traditional morality, of literary decency and the corporate feeling of the *litterati*. Moreover, this process went further than the simple analogy of the tendencies inherent in money and intellect. It became more and more generally accepted that only their union within one man would allow, especially in politics, the most complete exploitation of all ways of using power. A party leader of the first rank such as Cosimo de’ Medici dominated his party with money and intellect, with his wealth and his ability. His leading position was based upon economic and intellectual superiority, on the power of wealth and on *virtù*. As for Lorenzo, his intellectual attainments are no less known than his lack of scruple in financial matters.

Thus free rein was given to the feeling of liberty and the absence of all limitations which had come to the fore together with the newly attained independence. Commerce and knowledge had emancipated themselves: no longer should there be any superior authority, human or otherwise, to keep them in leading strings. Men felt that they had at last attained their majority in matters economic, political and intellectual. The new conditions of life brought with them new attitudes and new

valuations. The assertive self-consciousness of the *novus homo* made him reject any power which would impose limits. The free individual, free to dispose of his property, be it material or intellectual, as he thought fit, was the order of the day. The Middle Ages had known "free" property no more than a "free" individual; there had been but Life and Office; neither had there been the concept of "intellectual property". The idea that an author or an artist could claim any property rights in "his" works arose only with the new wish to be original, to be a "*uomo singolare*" or "*unico*". It was the idea of the self-conscious author, demanding in Petrarca's words that "everyone should write his own style" in order to have a personal influence on others. In the same way, this was the time in which the idea gained ground that the state is the private property of the prince and that the entrepreneur may exercise unlimited property rights over the means of production.

This new attitude towards property was stimulated and justified by the ethics of productive capital, i.e. the full mobilization of material as well as intellectual "goods". In the Middle Ages everything, be it economic or intellectual, was kept within its boundaries, because conditions were relatively static and in both fields a fixed and known "demand" had to be satisfied. Scholasticism attempted only to administer a fixed and known amount of truth. By contrast a capitalist economy and modern methodical science are the expression of an urge towards what is on principle unlimited and without bounds; they are the expression of a dynamic will to progress *ad infinitum*. Such were the inevitable consequences of the break-up of an economically as well as intellectually closed community. Instead of a closed economy administered in the traditional mode and by a privileged group by way of monopoly, we now find an open cycle and the corresponding change in consciousness. The spirit which served to break up the mediaeval principle of producing for a defined need and substituted an unlimited pursuit of profit, the spirit which broke up the mediaeval political system revolving around the two focal points of Empire and Papacy and replaced it by an open system, also made its mark in intellectual developments. It destroyed theocentric thought with its strict surveillance by the Church. We now have "purely human" ways of thought, free in their individualism. It was the thought

of freely competing individuals, an unending process which no longer confined itself to certain predetermined intellectual needs, but was the result of the endeavours of so many different intellectual "personalities" prompted by an inner dynamic urge. They were concerned with their own intellectual output, with *Erkenntnis*, in the same way as the artist cared for his own creations and the capitalist for his commodities. They were no longer primarily interested in satisfying a demand, and considered their "produce" as the proof and documentation of their creative intellect.

It is possible to interpret in a very lofty sense this description of the modern intellectual as an individualist entrepreneur. Yet the Renaissance itself gives us reason to draw the comparison, which expresses a stylistic similarity, in an exceedingly tangible sense. Often the humanist would treat his "humanist erudition" as a rare merchandise, as a thing of "scarcity value"; he would exhibit himself "on the market and not without publicity", i.e. where a "purchaser might notice him" and then "let himself be well paid as a valuable attraction by the highest bidding prince, town or university" (Honigsheim). But even where such unpleasant aspects were avoided, the learned had to begin to work for a "free market". The new psychology created among the materially and intellectually leading strata the type of the entrepreneur, bent on conquering the world in this secularized era by means of the new powers: money and intellect.

Thus in many ways there was a close correlation between the mercantile classes and the intelligentsia. They shared a common bourgeois origin and had complementary interests: in the former instance social prestige, in the latter material and social support; they had a common attitude and were brought together by the inherent objective and stylistic relationship of money and intellect. At the same time there were very definite tensions, and the complexity of the relationship is only brought out by this dichotomy between kindred feeling and tensions.

The relationship of work and intellect, of business and knowledge, was a relationship of two social groups drawn from the same social strata and conditions. But their leadership extended over two very different fields, which as ideal types are in fact diametrically opposed. An alliance came about, but the two partners went their own separate ways along the path of their

particular conception of bourgeois self-expression ; this independence of each other, accentuated by the two different lines of advance, could but preserve and increase the tensions which were present from the very beginning. Everything is expressed in the two words denoting the central ethical and social valuations. " *Virtus* " and " *virtù* " are, formally speaking, the same, which points to a similarity in character of the system of valuation of both sides. Yet, when the same word once appears in the exclusive Latin of the learned, in fact in an academic guise, and once in the language of practical life, we can at once see the wide rift between the valuations of the man of theory and the man of practice.

It should be remembered, though, that it was only in a bourgeois atmosphere that that individualism could arise which gave their specific character to the new concepts of *virtus* and *virtù*. Only after the decline of the universal powers, the Empire and the Papacy, and the consequent loss of validity of the corresponding universal ideologies, was it possible for the life of society and the current modes of thought to assume a bourgeois character. From the scope of the remote universal monarchy and of metaphysical things, the *corpus mysticum*, vision contracted. Dante was still engrossed by the mediaeval Empire, whereas for Petrarca this was no more than a half-complete self-deception. The contracted vision, as was natural where the *πολις* stood for the universe, concerned itself with the realities of bourgeois town life, with " natural " causes and the individual ; all mediaeval symbolism disappeared and reality emerged in its proper and increasingly defined contours. The new vision brought with it new mental attitudes, isolating, concrete and individual ; everything was regarded in a secular, rational light and all things, be they business, politics or the intellect, were treated as autonomous and subject to their own particular laws. In addition, town life itself greatly broadened its scope, far beyond anything conceived in the Middle Ages, and the narrow social and intellectual outlook of the crafts disappeared, taking with it the variegated, separate ethical group standards.

It is certain that the individualism which was thus making its way provided a link between the industrious and politically active bourgeoisie and the new intelligentsia. Yet, however great the feeling of interdependence, at bottom these two groups

recognized a very marked differentiation. As always, there was definite opposition on the most important points, between the ruling social group and the leading intellectual group. Both sides were conscious of the final antinomy of the spirit and of society, especially if society be built upon a money economy; an antinomy of culture and civilization, of quality and quantity, of "higher" values and utility values. In spite of the parallelism of money and intellect already described, there remained a tendency for the one to despise the other. Many are the humanists' complaints about the philistinism of the propertied classes who were accused of a purely materialist outlook; yet this is rather a complaint against the actual behaviour of certain circles and the occasionally flaunted contempt for money was in large measure a case of sour grapes. For their part, the sober merchants must occasionally have regarded the flowery orations of the humanists with something akin to ridicule (7), and their self-importance must have given rise to some irony. But the trouble was much deeper rooted than that. As the intellectual easily tends to regard the propertied classes as a threat to intellectual culture, so do the wealthy tend to think of the intelligentsia as a threat to established civilization. Among the ruling classes there is an instinct which strongly warns them against the consciously critical and unconsciously inimical attitude towards society inherent in the "pure" intellect. On the other hand, the intelligentsia, regarding itself as charged with a special spiritual mission and hence thinking of itself as the *élite* of its class, desires to be recognized as such; this recognition is not forthcoming because the intelligentsia has its own detached existence in society, which is reflected in its attitudes and its philosophy. As a result, the bourgeois is unable to acknowledge without reserve the intelligentsia as representing him in matters of the mind and is equally unprepared to look upon it as being in any way superior to himself; we find the reverse attitude when the erudite feel that the great mass of the bourgeoisie, intent on gain alone, do not accord them sufficient recognition. So we see an inner rebellion of the bourgeois intelligentsia, composed of men proudly conscious of their individuality, against the mass of the bourgeoisie *qua* commercial class. It is true that bourgeois society is in point of time the first to support the man of intellectual capital alone, who uses it to make his

living ; yet he himself generally feels that he is being held down by the bourgeoisie and resents bitterly an excessively " bourgeois " contempt for matters of the mind among the propertied, trading and politically powerful class.

It is not really possible to compare the loose type of relationships of an individualist era with those of a community bound tightly together by religious tradition and ecclesiastical organization. Yet the humanist may be said to have stood to bourgeois society as the monk did to the mediaeval hierarchy. Religious " public opinion " rated the monk especially highly—but this savoured somewhat of the theoretical. In reality the representatives of the " ecclesiastical type " (the terminology is taken from Troeltsch), though they treated the monks as an élite which emphasized their special character and rigorous outlook, regarded them as somewhat unwanted and rather inconvenient, though on the other hand quite indispensable. This tension accounts for and is explained by the monks' comparative segregation from the world, whereas the more compromising " ecclesiastical type " took part in it as an exponent of the ecclesiastical *vita activa*. But also " blood " and vitality, the nobility and the great prelates who were, for the most part, drawn from its ranks, reacted against the monastic champions of pure spirit and asceticism. Thus came about a certain fissure between the leading mediaeval intellectual and spiritual group and the rest of society including the secular clergy—a differentiation to which the representatives of pure intellect are easily inclined. They gave up all outer relationships, they severed the ties of social rank and family and stood aside from all " worldly " relations (including the principle of the Church on earth), in order to devote themselves entirely to a spiritual principle, i.e. the service of the transcendental. Now, with the full reserve which must be used when speaking of ties in an individualist age, and in particular when applied to those hyper-individualists, the humanists, it is possible to see in those preachers of the *vita speculativa* (Salutati once distinguishes it from the monastic *vita contemplativa*) a group which in some aspects of its social behaviour was similar to the mediaeval monks. The representatives of the new bourgeois and hence secularized erudition cut adrift from the " profane " mass, from the too worldly and the excessively materialist, and in so doing took up a typically non-bourgeois and even anti-bourgeois posi-

tion. In the same way as the monk lived withdrawn from the world, we now find arising the characteristic ideal of a humanist mode of life, beginning already with Petrarca : a *vita solitaria procul negotiis*. The fact that solitude is a prerequisite of study, which was synonymous with humanist *virtus*, best shows how little their life fitted in with all concepts of bourgeois efficiency which were admired by the exponents of a *vita activa*. It also shows something of the comparative irrationalism which was part of the humanist mode of life and action in contrast to the calculating rationalism of the business-like bourgeoisie : here again emerges the parallel with the monks.

In part, the humanists resembled the old contemplative social type of the monks, whose work they continued by carrying on the pursuit of worldly learning, which the latter had administered by way of secondary occupation and without according it any primary importance ; in part, the humanists belonged to the bourgeoisie, almost against their own inclinations. They were, in fact, only half at home in either set of surroundings and were regarded almost as traitors by both sides, and indeed felt themselves as such, reacting with bitter resentment. The humanist hatred of scholasticism especially partook somewhat of the consciousness of emancipation and the awareness that the independence of secular learning was due to its revolt from the combined religious and worldly learning which used to be united in the priest. In consequence the intelligentsia, closely hemmed in on all sides, though receiving contributions from and maintaining contact with all sides, must have seen itself as a " class between classes " ; to this peculiar position is due its lack of character, typical of the *litterati*. It is also possible, on the other hand, to regard the capitalist group, the *haute bourgeoisie*, as such a class between classes, for it owned both a democratic tendency and a tendency towards segregation, the latter being the basis of its later assumption of an aristocratic and courtly character. But the fundamental difference was that the business man was creating for himself a firm economic basis, whereas the humanist had to dispense with it. It was this which gave to the intelligentsia its independent and unattached character. Though the capitalists were lacking in character too, in that they used the democratic idea as an empty ideology, they could more easily afford to do this because the real basis of their existence was an

economic one ; the intelligentsia, on the other hand, was based on ideas, and such a false attitude would tend to undermine the whole of its position. This questionable nature of the whole of the humanist life has a host of illustrations. One need only read the historian of the Italian humanists, Georg Voigt, on the life of Petrarca—a man whose personal genius gave him special protection.

Economic dependence forced the humanists, whose instinct was against the *vulgus* in any case, to move among the well-situated. And if they could not get assistance from the *haute bourgeoisie*, they sought it from the remainder of the feudal nobility (cf. Petrarca and the Colonna) or at the courts of the new despots and princes (cf. Petrarca again). When, as was the case with the Medici, these sprang from the bourgeoisie, the wheel had come full circle.

II

THE CURVE OF DEVELOPMENT

The impetus of the bourgeois individualist dynamic set in motion a cultural process which traced a curve beginning with an abrupt rise and, after reaching its culmination, flattening off gradually.

(a) *RISK AND THE SPIRIT OF ENTERPRISE*

No new social group can come to the fore and create its own culture without the spirit of enterprise, without inner tension which releases its latent energies or without the will to run risks. To the knight such an attitude had actually been an end itself and the meaning of his existence. The *huohe muot* (literally : "high courage") required in a life spent amidst constant danger, continually occupied with thoughts of life and death, gave its tenor to his concept of honour. In poetry we find this ideal glorified by as early a writer as Bertran de Born and as late a writer as Molinet. In consequence, the noble would look down upon the bourgeois whose one thought was of money-making and of a life "*en paisible assurance*"; however rich he might be, he was "*de soy . . . gaires capable de hautes attributions*". As late as the fifteenth century, the "Waning" of the Middle Ages, the bourgeois was despised in Burgundy "*pour cause que celui estat . . . est au degré servile*" (Molinet). Such was the place of even the richest bourgeois in a society which preserved the strict division into Estates, and was capable of thinking only in categories of higher and lower rank, accepting them as universally valid laws of divine institution. The contrasting of arms and money, daring and security, war and peace was thus, in typically mediaeval fashion, linked with the specific unalterable nature of different Estates. One Estate was born into a life of security, and hence without "honour", while the other took as its device : "Our life is worth living only if it takes us through constant dangers." (Thus Gottfried Kinkel's character *Otto der Schütz.*) This wholly expresses the antinomy of the two Estates, which

quickly led to extremes of mutual suspicion and dislike. Because there was a genuine social separation it could express itself in thought, so that each Estate had its own ethics and its own set of values.

In Italy already in the Middle Ages relations had been different because of the great power and independence of the towns and the cardinal importance of the ports. As the nobility became urbanized it gradually intermingled with the upper bourgeoisie, especially with the advent of the Renaissance. The democratic ideology formally removed the barriers of class, but this meant only that the barriers between the *haute bourgeoisie* and the nobility fell (1). As the Estates intermixed, so did their outlooks, the military daring of the noble and the economic calculation of the bourgeois. And from this marriage sprang the spirit of enterprise—first in maritime trade—which combined the warlike with the mercantile elements. Thus, the marauding expeditions which brought fame to cities such as Amalfi, Pisa, Genoa or Venice, were on a thoroughly rational basis, organized along capitalist lines from a comparatively early date. They were warlike expeditions, but the spirit which generally expressed itself in the unruly forms of mere lust for plunder (e.g. the expeditions of the Normans, the Crusades, or the wars of the *Cid* in Spain), corresponding to the feudal standards of Germanic “barbarians”, was here ruled by the principles of economic *ratio*. It was the “heroic age” of the earliest capitalism (Max Weber) and the leaders seem to have been “often enough nobles, who might seek compensation in this field” (Sombart). The “secularization of the romanticism of religion and the power urge into the romanticism of technics and utility” is also an expression of these “heroic elements” within capitalism (Scheler). Piracy was their first outlet. Scheler counts among the “phenomena of the transition from the early, daring and forceful spirit of enterprise to genuine capitalism” the *condottieri*. These gang leaders represented the “combined type of soldier and business man” in a form which gave equal pride of place to considerations of gain and of glory. In the economic field the attitude of the bourgeois merchant became increasingly dominant over that of the pugnacious noble. More and more the emphasis was laid upon peaceful methods, bargaining and calculation and the bourgeois virtue of thrift. This is the spirit

of inland trade, in contrast to the piratical maritime trade, and Florence was its prime exponent. From the thirteenth century at the latest, according to Sombart, there was a corresponding change in the methods adopted in the Levant by the Florentines on the one hand and the Venetians, Genoese and even Pisans on the other. As for Florence herself, she was a thoroughly martial town as long as the Germanic nobility remained dominant, i.e. until the thirteenth century. After that date the nobility was assimilated to the now dominant *haute bourgeoisie*. But since Florence was not only a town of commerce (especially in wool) but also a centre of finance, the inclination towards taking risks was accorded an especially privileged position in this world of bankers. There was also a sharp differentiation between the merchant who had made good by his own *virtù* and the *cani del danaio* for whom the former had nothing but contempt. In Florence too we can find the typical spirit of the entrepreneur; it expressed itself in forethought and an organizing will, fitting the means to the desired end: it denied all heedless impulse, but there was room for initiative, daring and elasticity. The new commercial ethics which allowed for the factor of risk had its effects even on the moral teaching of the Church (2), which had to allow a premium in return for a corresponding risk of loss and thus broke down the rigid dogma of the *iustum pretium*. A moral theologian such as Bernardino of Siena recognized that "capital has not the character of money as such . . . but beyond that a creative power" (*quandam seminalem rationem*). Thus, even those branches of public opinion which based themselves upon the teachings of the Church legitimized the spirit of enterprise, that leaven which changed the stable and secure Middle Ages into an age of free competition. Competition in politics as well as business arose quite naturally in Italy, for it was there that the decline of the universal Empire left the road clear for the free play of political forces. The new dynamic was the result of the lack of any stabilizing factor in political life, all the emphasis being placed upon the *virtù* of him who was taking the risks, be he *condottiere*, despot or *nuovo principe*. The *ratio* and the energy of the entrepreneur—soldier or politician—was not backed by any title of law; he alone bore the dangers of the usurper and had to master the difficulties of the undertaking by his own powers of

organization. The indispensable qualifications for such a task were daring and ruthlessness, and only they, together with astuteness and leadership, could give birth to the New.

(b) *THE CULTURE OF THE NEW RULING CLASSES; THE NEW STATIC AND BOURGEOIS CONSERVATISM*

"Only danger is the road to great things"—Palmieri's saying voices the attitude of his day. It was a young, creative age of fresh and daring energy; an age of new developments, delighting in businesslike activity and in profit. Alberti still made it a rule for the well-being of the family that its wealth should be continually on the increase; he believed in the most profitable enterprises, in *gran traffichi*, whether in commerce or in the textile industry. But at the same time Pandolfini could prefer the textile industry to commerce as being less risky. The experience of a varying fortune, the knowledge that *virtù* cannot always prevail against *fortuna*, had already given prominence to the desire of simply preserving wealth. Morelli, for instance, though he still regarded the acquisition of wealth as part of the divine order of things, yet favoured a safe moderation. He was still a genuine merchant and would not dream of contracting a family alliance with any other profession; but, though his thought was economically conditioned, he would rather earn little than risk much, for he dreaded losses: he wanted security above all. Withal, he was conscious of belonging to an old-established family and kept the *cani del danaio* at a safe distance. Solicitude for its substance was bringing round the bourgeoisie to the genuinely middle-class ideal of moderation in all things, including business. At times even Alberti took up such a position; a simple "golden mean" is in the interests of a secure and happy life. The consciousness of the precarious nature of continued success was steadily diminishing the valuation of success as such, and the liberal bourgeoisie became increasingly "conservative".

Pandolfini made two points in preferring industry to commerce: the insecurity of the latter and the exhausting demands it made upon its votaries. He preferred the textile industry "*per mio riposo*". Here we have epitomized the contrast with those earlier days in which the Florentine government could

give as one reason for the encouragement of state shipping that "young people were wasting their energies without a profession" (1). In those days even the most prominent citizens expected that every one of their sons should have a regular occupation, and made it a condition of inheritance. It even happened that they requested the state to inflict a heavy fine upon any son who infringed this mandate. It is, of course, significant that it was found necessary to resort to such extreme methods.

From the very beginning the Florentine financial aristocracy had shown conservative economic tendencies. At an early date it invested in land to secure safe, though limited proceeds. One step further takes us to Alberti trying to prove that real estate was preferable to mobile property. The bourgeois was beginning to be saturated and secure investment alone began to count.

"As he grows richer, the bourgeois stagnates; he becomes a rentier and lives a life of luxury" (Sombart). Instead of investing in capitalist enterprises he grows lazy and wishes for nothing more than a comfortable life. This change comes over Florence towards the end of the fifteenth century. The capitalist spirit disintegrated, trailing off into complacent rentierdom. This undermined the spirit of enterprise and a pleasurable luxury replaced the old "economic" way of life. The zenith had been reached and passed and the declining curve was soon to lead to the last phase. This was the self-betrayal of the bourgeoisie in its new inclination to courtly circles and its imitation of the seignorial life. One need only mention the outstanding case of the Medici, whose business ability decreased from generation to generation. Cosimo still showed personal strictness and the simplicity of a rising generation, where Lorenzo lived in daily splendour. Cosimo was an active and energetic banker, whereas Lorenzo let affairs slide to the verge of bankruptcy. And, as the Medici were leaders in politics as well as business, we can follow the same change on that side as well. Cosimo still exercised the tactful discretion of the "first citizen", while Lorenzo, the "Magnificent", liked himself in the part of a prince. Cosimo was in all ways the servant of the state, but his successor turned it to account for his own private interests. Cosimo regarded his respected integrity as an essential basis of

his position, whilst Lorenzo acted according to his own sweet will. This social development was bound, on the political side, to have even more pronounced effects upon those who did not occupy the leading positions. Among them, in step with the increasing inclination towards economy rather than enterprise, there was a growing "rationing" of the energies devoted to public life. Alberti advised economy in all walks of life, including the participation in public affairs; he warned of ambitions though one should not "withdraw completely". What a contrast this was to the burning political passions of a Salutati! The fact that everything was regarded from an economic point of view was bound to push politics into a secondary place, and now that the passion for an active life was waning, politics were increasingly neglected. Burckhardt already spoke of the "pleasure taken in a life of ease which destroyed love of the fatherland".

The real political dangers inherent in an attitude which was supposedly one of *Realpolitik*, but in reality was one of mere calculation only, may be illustrated by one example. Considerations of "profit", of "utility" and "security", actually led to a preference for mercenary auxiliaries over a citizen levy (2).

Even the original type of political entrepreneur, the despot, underwent considerable change. He used to be actuated exclusively by a political profit motive, and to its pursuit all his energies were harnessed. Now illegitimate despots became hereditary dynasts, naked domination (*signoria*) became traditional and all energies were bent to the maintenance of the position won; the usurped power must be legitimized, guarantees must be found for what had been an existence devoid of guarantee. The *nuovi principi* themselves sought their comfort and forfeited their wonted fire. It was the beginning of the state (*lo stato*), a static system to be maintained at all costs; the dynamic political powers were chained. Statecraft was confined to serving what already existed with all the rational means at its disposal. Accordingly, the relation of ruler and ruled was put upon the basis of mutual advantage (of course it always remained a *societas leonina* with the prince playing the part of the lion). This typically bourgeois idea of a state providing welfare had already been foreshadowed by the south Italian

kingdom of Frederick II which had, of course, always been legitimate. As the new dynasties ceased to be reckoned as usurpers they could take up the thread that had been dropped by the Hohenstauffen. Patrizzi called a state "perfect" if it "lacks nothing necessary to well-being". The ideal of bourgeois "order" was in fact coming to mean little more than welfare. Given a guarantee of social and economic predominance, the *haute bourgeoisie* was ready to come to terms with the new absolutist states and even to sacrifice its democratic republican institutions, which after all had never been more than a decent veil for plutocracy. It was giving up the fight for its own political future in order to enjoy the comforts of an imposed peace guaranteed by superior power. The *haute bourgeoisie* was already on the point of turning reactionary and of fixing its attention on the past.

(c) *HUMANISM: ROMANTICISM AND RESTORATION*

Along these lines the bourgeois was again to meet the humanist. The first meeting had been on democratic territory. But even at that time side by side with the bourgeois humanists there had been the free *literati*, such as Petrarca. The line continued through Poggio, Valla, Aeneas Sylvius, Filelfo, and so forth. Bourgeois humanism retained its ties to the actualities of practical life, seeking to serve them. So, for example, it was intended that the portrayal of the great personalities among the ancients should unleash political ardour. Salutati considered the function of the humanist to be in bourgeois and democratic terms much the same as the function of the chivalric humanists of the Burgundian court; Charles the Bold "*désiroit grand gloire . . . et eust bien voulu ressembler à ces anciens princes*", meaning the heroes of classical days (1). The translation into bourgeois terms tended, of course, to diminish the stress laid upon personal "honour", and warriors pure and simple did not represent the ideal. But it must not be thought that there were any pacifist elements in the attitude of this early bourgeoisie: its ideal was not so much personal glory as the military discipline of a people, and it thus sought its models in the earlier days of the Roman republic. The generation of Salutati saw *virtus* as a heroic masculine virtue, accentuating the democratic element of self-

sacrifice, and looked upon the history of antiquity as the school of these qualities. It took its philosophy from the Stoics, following an interpretation of Cicero and Seneca which gave prominence to their most rigorous aspects. Noble passion was as yet limited by a certain narrowness in scope. But already the next generation characteristically extended its scope to the whole of humanity, as for instance in the Aristotelianism of Bruni. As yet they continued to uphold the cult of the *vita activa et politica*. Only later did the concept of society displace the community, only later did aestheticism tone down the active life and the ideal of a personal perfection displace the ideal of active service in public life. In fact, the humanist bourgeois was replaced by the humanist *littérateur* of the type of Petrarca. Humanism came to mean a harmony of the soul which took its name from Plato and evolved into a refined and effusive cult. To this romantic attitude (2), rooted in a typical "liberal" outlook (Carl Schmitt), corresponded a political attitude given to illusions and opportunism. Even this was already foreshadowed by Petrarca, whose republicanism and democratic opinions were but the outcome of his admiration for Rome, whose enthusiasm could be fired by a fantastic figure like Rienzi or the long-dead ideal of a universal monarchy (this at the time when Charles IV's Italian expedition brought this idea within the scope of his experience). His remoteness from reality made him incapable of penetrating to the sober nucleus of things. Such an achievement was impossible to him on account of his self-willed isolation, and this same isolation made him regard everything which was too firmly rooted in the soil of reality, everything which was alien to his purely intellectual, i.e. self-created ideals, as banal and too "bourgeois". The man of genius or the man who believed himself to be a genius wanted to emphasize the distance that separated him from the ordinary man. He stressed the freedom of his personality by standing aside from all bourgeois ties and by maintaining his freedom in face of professional life, the state or the family. He never committed himself, never made final decisions but kept an eye on all possibilities, a-socially and even anti-socially preserving his aestheticism. From the excessive glare of a rational civilization the romantic humanist retired into the twilight of a purely literary and imaginary world; he sought a distant dream world in the remote past in which he

could give free rein to his wish-dreams. Because he was dissatisfied with his own times, as Petrarca explicitly admitted, he sought refuge in an idealized past, access to which was denied to the mass of the people. That was his way of cutting himself off from his day ; unlike the revolutionary intellectual who seeks refuge in a Utopia of the future, he was the reactionary type, a *laudator temporis acti* cut off from reality and from life. Humanism was the ideal framework for such inclinations (3). Even in purely academic matters we can see its reactionary nature. It was the anachronistic revival of "classical" Latin which transformed Latin from a living into a dead language ; the equally anachronistic isolation of antiquity as a cultural value for its own sake destroyed the last links which bound it to the organism of living culture. But only in this isolation—as opposed to its organic part in mediaeval culture and as opposed to the humanists' own times—could antiquity play the part for which it was cast in humanism. It was to be the symbol of the independence of the lay intellectuals, separating them from the mediaeval clerics (who could allow it no more than a part in harmony with their whole system of thought and values), but also separating them from the bourgeois propertied classes. It was a romanticizing, cultural idealism which separated the humanist from the sober realism and rationalism of the bourgeois ; he stood for a "higher" irrationalism of purely spiritual ideals without practical application. Sociologically speaking, this is how the desire of the intelligentsia to segregate itself from and remain independent of the propertied classes expressed itself. It was the spontaneous reaction away from a civilization which had no use for culture for its own sake because in any case its cultural interests tended to be limited and indirect. Thus the intelligentsia tended to emphasize even more the self-sufficiency of a purely intellectual attitude—even though it thus contributed to its own isolation and exile. Such an isolated existence is, in the last resort, natural to the intelligentsia. It saves itself from the buffetings of reality by retiring into the idyllic existence of an Isle of the Blest where a calm classicism reigns, unruffled by actual life (4). Petrarca himself was driven by his disinclination to fight into a world of beautiful illusions and the repose of his study, whither the turbulence of his time could not follow. A noble leisure devoted to spiritual immersion in the world of

ideals was to him the way to that inner calm, that *tranquillitas animi*, which had been the consummation of life in the tired, late classical philosophy of Seneca. This is the highest ideal of the man who in his wish to achieve independence on the insufficient basis of pure intellect has cut himself off completely, and is no longer able to cope with the outside world : he is driven to accepting introversion as the final ideal, the *ultima ratio*.

These tendencies have been characterized as "humanist anachoretism" to distinguish them from earlier similar phenomena. Here, too, the essence of the change was sociological. In the Middle Ages hermitism had a definite function in the organic community created by religious beliefs, the *corpus mysticum*, which had reality in the consciousness of the times ; the Church had allotted to it a definite place where it could fulfil a defined function within the social order. The devotees of the contemplative life in the Middle Ages, the monks, were still a social Estate, with a definite vocation within the order of Estates. Only with the humanist did intellectual pursuits become a matter of dilettantism, i.e. the grounds upon which a private and consciously segregated existence might be justified. Such an existence, devoted to the secular sciences, became possible only in bourgeois society ; on the other hand, the ideal of an existence devoted to oneself and to one's studies, as it is formulated already by early humanists—Poggio was even more pointed and spoke of "*sibi soli vacare*"—such an ideal which puts first the private interests of the isolated individual is again very "un-bourgeois". The *littérateur* is the adventurer of the spirit who has broken away from every kind of *ordo*, even the bourgeois. In the mediaeval system even adventure found its allotted place : it was a part of chivalry and the Crusades were its greatest manifestation. At the same time the intellect had not yet broken away to independence and was still monopolized by the clergy as the *ancilla theologiae* ; there were writers but no *literati*, for the *literati* are by their nature opposed to any controlling authority. With the exception of a few "enlightened" minds such as Abélard, the intellect had not yet become "venture-some". But with the coming of a bourgeois world the chivalrous "venture" became impossible—witness that decadent adventurer and bastardized rationalist, the *condottiere*. At the same

time the intellect was no longer what it had been, and even among the clergy the vagrant scholar became prominent. With the destruction of the universally valid order the intellect went its own ways, the personal ways of the new intellectual adventurer. Romanticism in action was replaced by romanticism in the intellectual field which is typical of a bourgeois age, for no era can dispense with all forms of irrationalism. But of course a rational age will tend to confine its irrationalism to the periphery and will not allow it to retain a hold over the very centres of its material and spiritual life, as it had done in the Middle Ages.

The town is the vital centre of the bourgeois era. It is there that the bourgeois carries on that business which provides the basis of his existence, there he engages in politics, bourgeois politics, there the new intellectual attitude is shaped. But this new intellectual spirit, which formed in the towns and not in some monastery, takes up a position opposed to the town, by a curious inversion typical of the *litterati*. Significantly this was not true of Salutati, who remained firmly rooted in the urban bourgeoisie, but Petrarca, Poggio and Sadoletto thus showed their desire to keep at a distance the bourgeois engaged in his daily routine. The newly discovered affection for the rustic life of the villa was no more than a reaction, a desire for contrast. The humanist *littérateur* shares his attitude to the countryside with every kind of urban intellectual: all of them think of the rustic life as a change and a recreation. Petrarca actually regarded the peasants as the "dregs of humanity" (5). It is but an instance of the specifically modern desire for change of a loosely knit society, expressed in the form of travel for recreation. For in no case can the *littérateur* dispense with the *celebritas urbis*, the talk of the town. He needs the town and even the masses to provide a setting for his fame. Even Petrarca was content that the *profanum vulgus* should stand in formation and cheer when he was "crowned" on the Capitol. Otherwise, contact with the crowd meant no more than disturbance from which it was good to retire to the study and occasionally to the villa (cf. Alberti). It is characteristic of the humanist position as that of a class between classes that the social composition of the "crowd" was never defined—the purely numerical category implicit in the term was enough to justify the derogatory atti-

tude of the humanist. Thus the emotional irrationality of this attitude and the desire for complete isolation are well shown up—though certain undercurrents brought it about that the segregation was not equally strict in all directions.

This escape from the turbulence of the world to the tranquillity of a private existence implied the renunciation of all participation in democratic politics and a romanticizing of public affairs. The concentration upon personal aspects of life and the humanist ideal of study was bound to bring about a reduction in the share taken in public affairs. The a-social attitude adopted could not but express itself, among other ways, by a decline of the interest taken in practical politics; cosmopolitanism, the attitude of those whose interests are personal and not political, or of those who adopt an anti-political stand, became fashionable among the humanist intelligentsia—to Petrarca cosmopolitanism was the expression of "tranquillity of soul" which remains untouched by everything that troubles the patriotically inclined (6). The love of political freedom gave way to a longing for the undisturbed existence of the private individual. In this quietist atmosphere, where the greatest desire was for peace and order, grew the *petit bourgeois* preference for an absolutist régime. It was this form of government which at the price of freedom seemed to offer the best guarantee of order and the best protection for a "*vita solitaria procul negotiis*" and "*remota a tempestatibus civilis insaniae*" (Poggio); it seemed to offer freedom for one's personal pursuits. Here we see joined to the romantic ideal of the "strong man" the anti-democratic attitude which affects to regard republican government as the domination of mediocrity, as the favouring of the rabble and in any case as the cause of that factionalism of which already Boccaccio complained. Furthermore, antiquity provided the myth of "men who make history", which the non-political humanist was only too prone to apply to any petty despot of his time who in any way impressed him. Thus again, the non-bourgeois, romanticizing outlook of the humanists coincided with his typically bourgeois interest in that order which would afford him leisure and calm. There was, as a matter of fact, also a republican kind of romanticism in circles influenced by humanism: a romanticism centred around the figures of Brutus and Cassius; how far this was any more than the ideological

guise of personal ambitions remains an open question. At any rate the unmistakable political development of the humanist takes us from the passionate love of liberty of Boccaccio and Salutati to Pontano's defence of unconditional obedience towards the established political authority.

The humanist ideal had moved far away from its initial bourgeois character, but also the economically active classes had moved on from their original position. Now, on another plane, the intellectual and the business man might meet again: the common ideal was one of security and quiet, of leisure and enjoyment; it was a culture of consumers instead of a civilization based upon economic acquisition (7).

Early capitalism did not yet know economic monomania; above every purely objective attitude it placed human values: its rationalism left room for a good deal of humanity. The great merchant, as described by Alberti, had time and taste for enjoyment and sport apart from his business. His personality had many facets to it and was not entirely subordinated to economic activity. He preserved some of that tendency to an all-embracing variety of interests of which, according to Burckhardt, Alberti himself was the typical example. In his book on the family we can watch the humanist ideal penetrating into the merchant's thought; it was an ideal of a "free man" facing up to the outside world, using commodities with conscious understanding but without being in any way dominated by them. The acquisition of wealth was but a means, not a means to positive power, but "*solo per non servire*". This double negation, a negation of the negative quantity *servire*, shows how static the ideal was and reveals how the pretensions of a conscious ruling class had been reduced to the hopes of an elevated middle class which was content to be left to its own devices. On these grounds the moneyed classes and the intellectuals could meet again. Once they had met in the consciousness of being the representatives of the new factors in the acquisition of power: intellectual and money capital. By now, they were interested in no more than its "safe" investment. In consequence, humanists such as Vegio and Vergerio, writers on pedagogy, could deduce the higher value of intellectual riches from the fact that they were securely held and could not be lost. To the professional humanist such an ideology came naturally: the acquisition of great wealth

was denied to him and as a result we find this overcompensation of a complex of economic inferiority. Only the few were called to the "highest" secular vocation, the humanist *vita speculativa*, as in the Middle Ages only the few had been called to the "highest" ecclesiastical vocation, the *vita contemplativa* of the monk. From Alberti's viewpoint the acquisition of material wealth acquired a special value: it afforded not only the means of spending one's own life in "*letizia*" and "*libertà*" but also ways of making possible those great works of science and art which alone made life beautiful! The new refined humanist idea of luxury, as meaning the readiness to spend money upon one's "noble passions", can be seen here. It was bourgeois inasmuch as it was anti-seignorial: should luxury mean expenditure on race-horses, Alberti disapproved—his economic instinct was outraged. The "noble passions" in their new urban meaning centred around books and buildings, in fact everything beautiful. A noble luxury, as the humanist understood it, was an intellectual and aesthetic luxury. This outlook corresponded to that of the saturated bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie which had become sated through the achievement of its aim, and which was now turning conservative and imposing limits upon itself. It was markedly different from that of the man who is entirely absorbed in his practical affairs, whose outlook is exclusively economically conditioned and who reinvests all his profits: above all, it is different from the outlook of the *parvenu* with his inclination to boastful and unbridled waste, of which Dante already accused the Florentine *gente nuova*. He called it the "*orgoglio e dismisura*" consequent upon the "*subiti guadagni*" (8) of a group which had too quickly been exalted by *fortuna*. By contrast, it was Alberti's ideal to combine a refined and cultured luxury with the maxim of keeping to the golden mean.

The bourgeois who had been engaged in active life, above all in business, had, to begin with, forced the representatives of pure learning on to the periphery of existence. But in the meantime the bourgeoisie itself had become untrue to its origins or at any rate to its original driving power: now activities at the centre were once more influenced from the periphery, culture coloured economic development and changes of sociological origin were helped along by the intellectual and cultural

influence of the intelligentsia. The *literati* were encouraging the bourgeoisie to become less and less true to itself. Both groups saw their ideal in the villa and within it they met again.

The first encounter had been within the town, amidst the vitality of an epoch which was giving birth to the new and demanded the utmost exertion of all creative powers. But in time the bourgeois became saturated, the humanist became the *littérateur* and a renewed encounter took place *procul negotiis*, far from the active world of business and politics and amidst the rustic calm of the villa, which became the symbol of the new spirit which was abroad. The emphasis which had been placed upon work was now transferred to leisure. The bourgeois needed the town to carry on his business, the humanist needed it as a fruitful spreader of his reputation: both drew their "income" from it. But also the capitalist had transferred his affections to the country which appeared to offer "*laetior vitae conditio*", even if it was only for the sake of change. Though such rustic calm may seem to be almost a precondition of the humanist's work, this escape into seclusion was to him also a cutting off from life. Learning became esoteric, the concern of the learned only; it became the monopoly of an exclusive high society, a cultured élite which could rally round the name of Plato. Culturally speaking, the triumph of the villa was the triumph of the humanist over the capitalist. The supreme example was the Villa Careggi with Lorenzo de' Medici in the circle of his Platonic Academy. The rational sense of the *haute bourgeoisie*, turned towards a sober reality, was on the point of dissipating itself and making room for an artistic aestheticism even among the economically active classes. The older, economically conditioned horror of idleness was replaced by the new desire for leisure, a desire which was somewhat sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought; it was seen as the noblest form of pleasure when devoted to the liberal arts and was held to serve the last refinement of the personality. This now appeared as the highest value; already Alberti saw fit to find a justification for the desire for gain; it must be the means to higher ends, among which we still find the common good, but also the cultivation of the personality on a purely intellectual plane. In the last resort this was one way of taking pleasure, however refined it might

be, and it was already a withdrawal from an active life into a world of beautiful illusions. Classical Antiquity, which from the earliest days of humanism had provided the model for humane, i.e. secular, learning, became, with the change of emphasis from intellectual and rational ("natural") ethics to the aesthetic values, the essence of the world of beauty.

The saturated bourgeois, who was now interested only in preserving and enjoying his wealth, and the humanist intelligentsia met on the grounds of a new static; its material manifestation was the villa, while the idea of classicism as the absolute model for everything beautiful and cultural was its intellectual manifestation. The triumphal march of Platonism went along the same road as led from the Florentine bourgeois republic to the Principate of Lorenzo de' Medici. Lorenzo was the typical "*virtuoso* of pleasure" to whom "even philosophy was but one link in the round of refined delights" (Brandi). His Platonic Academy was at the same time social and convivial.

(d) THE ART OF THE FULL RENAISSANCE

Only an exclusive and cultured society with a taste for Plato could be the proper soil for "classical" art; an art of perfected harmony and complete beauty.

The art of the Early Renaissance, being the art of the rising bourgeoisie, was full of realism, vigour and tension. It was the art of a period in which the large middle class was in profound agitation and filled with the urge to achieve a new social order. This urge had its counterpart in the dynamic of the new art. It was popular and democratic, because in its tendency towards realism it aimed at reproducing immediate reality. It was full of agitation because it still incorporated the urge towards something new, which characterizes a social group at a time when it is establishing itself and has to secure its power politically and economically, as well as in the fields of art and science. But at the time of the Full Renaissance this same group felt themselves to be the *beati possidentes*, economically as well as culturally. Like the merchant, the artist felt that his position and his art were socially accepted. Reality now began to appear vulgar and was admitted only in order to be brought to a higher level and perfected to a Platonic Idea. (Raphael actually said this

when talking about his own work.) The earlier bourgeois realism now appeared plebeian ; it had now to be raised to the refined forms of a style of perfect harmony. But harmony demands tranquillity ; it is a static ideal and will always transcend reality (1). In its clear forms, undisturbed by any sort of tension (2), it is in the last resort confined to the realm of the imagination ; it can be the ideal of a group only after it has built its house and is concerned with details of the interior alone ; it helps to bring out the distance between such a group and the rest of society which it feels and likes to emphasize. We thus see a refined and exalted style, which differentiates the art of the *cinquecento* from the simple bourgeois atmosphere of the *quattrocento*. The educated private individual of discriminating taste made his appearance as a patron of art. Architecture, the most public and popular art form (3), with its political importance, receded to some extent and was overshadowed by the more intimate forms of sculpture and, more significantly, painting. In the earlier Renaissance it was the Commune which placed orders and gave commissions to the artist. The approach was, even at that time, non-mediaeval in that it was consciously particularist, but the emerging individualism and desire for fame was still a communal one. But later, in step with the social changes, an interest in art became the preserve of the newly "privileged" classes, the rich and the educated ; the artist became the client of patrons from the *haute bourgeoisie* and the new dynasties. It was in the course of this development that art became subject to the classical ideal. The trend may be dated from Brunelleschi's first failure (a design submitted for the second bronze door of the Baptistery at Florence) and his subsequent trip to Rome which he undertook together with Donatello.

An aesthetic outlook, only possible to a settled upper class, a cultured and highly educated group, now came into its own. The bourgeoisie had ceased merely to calculate, and had acquired a sense for quality, including artistic quality ; it no longer thought in purely "economic" terms, and things which were not strictly "necessary" were appreciated as the accessories to a "noble" display ; leisure ceased to be a waste of time and was similarly valued. It was at this point that personal aesthetic needs arose, with a hitherto unknown inclination towards the ideal of art for

art's sake. This need for beauty postulated a sense of the beautiful, a receptiveness and training of the eye which cannot be imagined without feminine influence. Woman played a large part in creating and maintaining a refined, a tasteful type of sociability in the *salons* of the Full Renaissance; this was true of the great lady as much as of the courtesan famed for her excellent taste. An artistic turn was thus given to the whole of life, and all possibilities of a gay, luxurious and urbane life were enjoyed to the full. Formerly luxury had been public with the emphasis on display; now it became private and domestic, reflecting the desire to live among beautiful and graceful surroundings. This is best illustrated by the villa, which can develop only in a culture which stresses the "urbane", for the villa is a country-house with all the luxury of the towns. Art is here made to serve domestic comfort. Of this the outstanding example was the Villa Farnesina. Here then, we find the origin of the modern approach to nature which is no longer religious and symbolic but aesthetic and personal, and sentimental rather than naïve and direct. Such a feeling for the beauty of nature is born of the intellectual and emotional differentiation of the town-dweller. Only at this stage could genuine faculties of aesthetic appreciation develop because only now were there the requisite social conditions.

Only now do we meet the connoisseur with his personal relationship to art and the ability to make spiritual contact with the artist. Now the individuality of artist and patron emerges to a hitherto unknown degree. And as the connoisseur can apply the criterion of virtuosity, he contributes to the emergence of "artistic" styles, an art from the point of view of the artist. The artist began to be calculating in his expression and inclined to a form of composition according to rational principles of symmetry and to a nice balance of artistic effects. The artist and his public, a discerning élite, met on the common ground of harmony and proportion. "The spirit of reason, the clever management of matter, the quiet enlightenment of a cultured age of merchants . . . is expressed . . . also in the rationalization of the problem of form" (Hausenstein). "Management" and arrangement: that is also what happened in art. It was a way of looking at the world from above, of dealing with it according to reason. That this attitude should have been that

of the artist shows how much even he is, in his outlook, a part of the leading social groups of his day.

(e) *THE DECADENCE OF THE BOURGEOISIE AND THE
CALL FOR DICTATORSHIP*

There is always one danger for those who occupy the highest position : that the limit of ascent may be reached, that progress may cease and that there may remain no possibility of a continued upward development. Moreover, there is an added danger in the free disposition over all means : the dynamic enticement towards new goals may be stifled by the perfected manipulation of mere technique. In all fields, economic as well as cultural, political as well as artistic, a perfected virtuosity had been achieved and with it a certain static had intervened. The question could be asked whether *virtù*, an important element of which was activist energy, had not been buried under this ubiquitous virtuosity. This was the problem of Machiavelli. He, in a handbook of statecraft, gave a compendium of all the political methods of his day ; and yet his constant eager quest after *virtù* shows us the great shortcoming of these shifts and devices, and thus indicates the nature of the crisis of his times.

Machiavelli was a man who stood opposed to the spirit of his day ; he mercilessly criticized his times, whose weaknesses were patent to his penetrating eye. A sixteenth-century parallel to Oswald Spengler, he saw that bourgeois civilization had seen its spring and summer, that autumn had come and that winter was drawing near. It was this tragic cycle which to him was the fundamental law of all history ; he saw it in the story of Greece and Rome and again in the course of his own contemporary Renaissance. As the goal of endeavour is successfully achieved security comes, leading to " slackening and effeminacy " and thus to decay and ruin. To him the security of the bourgeois was his decisive danger ; it was a sign of decadence, and Machiavelli, who turned against everything which his contemporaries valued most, confronted them with his own vexatious philosophy. He was bitterly opposed to the idealization of prosperity as well as to the refined leisure of a humanist and artistic culture. These static ideals had exposed the bourgeoisie, once a powerfully rising class, to a comfortable complacency

wary of sacrifice ; thus *virtù* had decayed in its genuine dynamic meaning of *forza*, whose final expression was in war. Humanism had promised to raise men above a brutish state without culture and reason, and thus really to make them into men, but it achieved nothing beyond making them into "*bons bourgeois*". Far better if man were to return to the simplicity of his "brutish" existence (1), to the ideal of a primitive state of nature ; far better if the rich and cultured bourgeois were to become once again a poor but warlike peasant ! Just as Tacitus held up the Germans as a model to decadent Rome, Machiavelli pointed to the Swiss : they were a people of simple manners and life, an armed people and a real democracy. The national democrat pointed to the bankruptcy of bourgeois liberalism and announced the political failure of private capitalism. The money economy of the merchants had undermined the soldierly qualities.

Overland commerce, in contrast to maritime commerce, is by its nature not bellicose but purely mercantile in character, inclined to peaceful trading and bargaining (2). The militant self-confidence which gave strength to the inland communes in their heroic periods was a Teutonic heritage going back to the castles and the free peasant communities of Lombard days (Fedor Schneider). But the urban air, above all of Florence, where bankers became princes, overlaid it with bourgeois characteristics. Alberti's exemplary bourgeois and urban outlook belies completely the aristocratic blood of his warlike ancestors (3). He himself explained the outstanding business abilities of his compatriots by pointing out that they were able to devote themselves to this avenue to the exclusion of all others and were able to specialize completely, because they had no need for any sort of military training. War could be left to the mercenaries, and even the door to political prominence was unlocked by monetary wealth which had to be earned in business. Petrarca in his *Familiar Letters* wrote : "*Qui divites sunt, boni viri in civitatibus appellantur eisque tantum creditur.*" Reversing the mediaeval situation, economic assumed primacy over political matters—and thus also "reason" asserted itself over that passion which is prepared to go to war, for reason, left to itself, wants peace. In this manner the mercantile spirit got the better of warlike inclinations ; the idea of universal military training was lost and the "bourgeois" type arose with all its unmilitary virtues. Floren-

tine statesmen were able to praise "freedom" itself for its usefulness; the highest political ideal was judged by its utility value. Everything, including war, was regarded as business by the bourgeoisie. The multitude disarmed itself, accomplishing of its own free will what was usually the first act of a despotism after it had triumphed over the bourgeoisie. The citizen gave pride of place to the bourgeois. No longer able to fight, the bourgeoisie accepted as inevitable and normal pressure from above and maintained but the ideal of a private economic or humanist freedom; a freedom from interference by the state.

Machiavelli saw himself face to face with this situation, and he clearly grasped the interconnection of politics and economic matters as well as the antinomies between the common weal and the interests of the individual. In politics and war, so he thought, one should not forget the importance of economic power; the state must be rich in order to make full use of its power as a state. But could one call "the state" rich if it had a rich bourgeoisie? On the one hand, so he answered, the wealth of so many was a source of Florentine power, and he thought that one of the advantages of the free democratic town was that in it individual wealth was more easily increased; on the other hand, with wealth comes the danger of corruption, so that the blessing seemed a mixed one at best. Wealth militates against the *virtù* of individual and state alike; it impairs military prowess and thus the state becomes unable to defend itself. In the last resort, so he thought, the power of the state is the armed power vested in a militia. Italy was already threatened by foreign domination and the capitalist economy and capitalist policy had not been found sufficient in the struggle for power. So he argued that poor citizens serve the state better than rich: let them be poor and prepare for war. Let them be different from those "pure" merchants who live for the "philosophy of money", from whose calculating point of view egoism alone is logical and all "devotion and sacrifice" born of the irrational forces of emotion and desire are only the "proof of a lack of wisdom" and the butt of irony (Simmel). This bourgeois oneness and specialization was the key to the rise of bourgeois civilization, but it already contained the seeds of its decline and ruin. The exaggerated valuation of

business and of the mind, of reason and taste, had created a race which was bound to succumb in the struggle for political survival.

Now that the battle for survival or death had come, these "pale" bourgeois spirits of the type of Piero Soderini could talk of nothing but their bourgeois compromises "which are always harmful"; for them even hell was too good: they belonged to the *limbo dei bambini*. And, according to Machiavelli, such bourgeois policies with their soft, pacifistic and anti-heroic ideal corresponded to a morality which had been nursed by Christianity; not indeed the original Christianity of Christ but its degenerate clerical form. Ecclesiastical Christianity with its emphasis on the Beyond and on humility had helped to paralyse all love of liberty and all political energy, thereby working hand in hand with the mercantile interests. Thus traditional Christian and ecclesiastical morality had only worked against the necessary power policy of the state, putting into its place the clerical and by now empty though high-sounding ideology of the *optimus princeps* and the *rex iustus* who should be good and just, in the sense and interest desired by the Church. Against such an embellishing idealism Machiavelli's realistic honesty reacted with the desire for its complete destruction.

Machiavelli's dislike of clericalism was matched by his hatred of feudalism. Those nobles who devoted themselves to trade as the most profitable and respected calling that their ancestral town could offer, as they did at Venice and Florence, were in his eyes no longer members of the aristocracy; he regarded as the feudal type proper those nobles who in "idleness" and "abundance" lived off unearned rents. Machiavelli still maintained enough of the dislike of the early bourgeois, the *civis*, for the aristocracy, to desire its exile or extermination (4), because idleness and abundance were harmful to the state. He saw that the nobility had lost its function in a transformed society and in a new warfare, which was no longer based upon the arm of the well-to-do, the cavalry, but upon the foot soldier (5).

And so Machiavelli sought a common denominator for his anti-mercantile as well as his anti-clerical and anti-feudal convictions. He found it in a new humanist ideology, the myth of the *antica virtù*, the *virtù Romana*. The easy-going, static thought of men in the line of Sadoletto and Petrarca took as its ideal the

philosophic rentierdom of a decadent late classical period ; now it had become necessary to arouse Italy from this slumber. According to the habits of thought of his time, which looked upon Antiquity as the model in all things, Machiavelli projected backwards his ideal of dynamic energy and driving power to which he had been led by criticizing his own times. There he came upon the as yet unspoilt and simple Rome of the early Republic. This was a time when a vigorous paganism was as yet far from being ousted by an individualist, cosmopolitan humanist philosophy. To Machiavelli this paganism was an active source of strength to the state, whereas he was never able to come to anything more than an opportunist relationship with the Church or with humanity.

The consciousness of the decadence of his own day drove Machiavelli to the romantic idea of a rebirth of this *virtù Romana* in a "Third Reich". Against the threatening foreign conquest there was not even the will to resist : "*materia corrotta*" was his complaint. But, so he thought, the masses are never more than a rabble, and it is only the leader who matters. "Great men make history", the masses follow. The "rebirth" had to be brought about by a dictator, one who shall arise from the "obscurity of a lowly position" to bring about "*grandissime cose*" as one of the elect of *fortuna* and of that "god who befriends the strong" ; he shall be such as was Castruccio, the despot of Lucca, whose personality Machiavelli exalted to such an ideal.

Free of all traditional ethical norms he shall bring about the miracle of salvation by means of *virtù* only and with but one obligation : that of success. The miracle to be achieved was no less than that of winning freedom and unity for Italy by force of arms. In these romantic flights Machiavelli came precariously near to Petrarca the poet and dreamer ; his romanticism was the romanticism of Reason ; the belief that by means of skilful organization (*con l'arte ordinare*) everything could be compassed became a superstition, a caricature of *Realpolitik*. It was the last, desperate and already half-resigned cry of the "last free bourgeois" (Brandi). Soon the Sack of Rome was to put an end to all such illusions. Guicciardini had already got over this romanticizing of ancient Rome. This Florentine still felt and thought as a *civis*, he loved freedom and thought of the

new Medicean Duke of Florence as a tyrant. But he had accepted the end of the bourgeois phase and took things as they were. He had passed through the training of papal diplomacy and as an official of the Duke took his place in an age which had become courtly. He regarded himself purely as a civil servant, serving even where he hated, and actually argued himself into a belief in the duty of opportunism: this was the last stage of utilitarian realism.

(f) THE COURTS

The courts naturally became the centres around which crystallized the new aristocratic temper of society. There, preference was given to aristocrats and to a seignorial way of life, to which the bourgeois adapted themselves. The preconditions for the formation of the modern court were, in the economic field, the existence of great wealth, in the political field, the evolution of the absolute state, and in the social field, the decline of chivalry together with the urbanization of the aristocracy. Such courts appeared first at Avignon (for the Church being the most "advanced" institution of the Middle Ages led here as in other spheres) and gathered together an élite which united both secular and ecclesiastical *seigneurs* with the *haute bourgeoisie* and the intellectuals, artists and humanists. Even the republican city states had from the beginning harboured the germs of this aristocratization of the *haute bourgeoisie*. In Florence the money power of the *arti maggiori* had struck an alliance with a part of the old aristocracy of the *parte Guelfa* against the Ghibelline aristocratic magnates. Later we find members of the bourgeoisie striving to become princes. Seignorial manners were quickly and thoroughly accepted by them. The earlier Medici already adopted the tournament with a "passionate interest, as though they, private and ordinary citizens, wanted to prove that their convivial circle was the equal of any court" (Burckhardt). Tournaments became all the rage with the bourgeoisie, though, and this again was typical, a "less dangerous kind" was devised (Sombart). Such grotesque forms were assumed by the "mixture of bourgeois and feudal nature". The knight became the ideal of those who had attained to wealth and the road to feudalization was charac-

terized by the "despising of work and the chase after patents of nobility".

The humanists, beginning with Petrarca, had been attracted by this new form of élite, and already in his time gathered around the despots. The republican love of freedom which had clothed itself in the classic device "*in tyrannos*" soon became a harmless romanticizing as with Petrarca or empty effusiveness as in the Florentine "tyrant slayers" of the fifteenth century, or the even earlier Rienzi. How prone to compromise even the genuine and practising Republican was, was shown by Salutati, when he defended Caesar against Brutus: this was the result of thinking in terms of *Realpolitik*. Above all, the humanist *littérateur* felt himself alien to the sobriety, the thinking in terms of material utility and the parsimoniousness of the majority of a bourgeoisie actively engaged in business. In spite of his democratic and egalitarian ideology he easily gravitated towards aristocratic circles. He might sense an aesthetic attraction and feel that there was a kind of affinity between groups which accepted irrational, qualitative values, however different they might actually be. But above all, the courts themselves found a use for intellectual talent. They needed orators, chroniclers and artists to glorify, embellish and display. The humanists, such as Petrarca and Salutati, occasionally played off the *signori*, who were more sympathetic to humanist interests, against the propertied bourgeoisie. The artist became a permanent figure at court. It was in these surroundings that he found his principal patrons and became the recipient of honours and sinecures which he had not known before (1). It must of course be realized that the relationship to the court brought with it a new kind of dependence, especially where literary talents were concerned (biography, historiography). But some kind of tie, once clerical but not political, had always existed, even in the Communes. It became the real task of the humanist to serve prestige and display, and in consequence a suitable style was evolved. It was an imposing style, calculated to lend dignity and power, and in the last resort to have an eminently political effect. The personal glory of the prince was again conveyed in a supra-individual and conventionally externalized setting: this was the splendour of the dynasty, the family which represented the state. For the new splendour was to make good any deficiency

of the rulers in rank, ancestry and tradition. Art was specially qualified to do this. It must of course be understood that a society of cultured taste will never allow its art to become bombastic: in the Florence which had recently acknowledged the Medici, art showed the polish and aristocratic elegance of Botticelli, and as it intensified to the point of pathos it still displayed a search after exalted forms which were always "choice"—it was, in fact, the true form of display of a select society. The style of art as of life became "exalted".

Besides the prince his wife, and besides man woman also took a prominent part in evolving it. Whereas he was charged with display to the outsiders, she fulfilled the same function within the charmed circle. He had to deal mainly with architects, whereas the painters fell into her domain. While he thought in terms of fame and splendour, she cultivated good taste. But in both cases the desire to make life as refined as possible was pre-eminent.

The cultural rôle of woman increased in proportion to the increasingly courtly character of society. We already hear of women of the fourteenth century who took a part in humanist discussions, at the *Paradiso degli Alberti* or in Luigi Marsigli's writings. But Alberti still had different views. To him the ideal wife of the bourgeois "willingly obeyed" her husband; she should allow him to "guide" and "educate" her and even to cure her of the "most pernicious" habit of making-up. He does, on the other hand, already make the real as well as subjective proviso that he should "know how to be a man". But there we still have the bourgeois ideal of the good wife completely submissive to her husband. In Vespasiano da Bisticci's portraits of women we see how much of the clerical tradition and of the ideal of monastic education was preserved in his "bourgeois" morality; we see how only gradually the good old times with their traditional stern habits and customs and their mediaeval ties were displaced by the looser humanist ideas of the wicked present, from which not even Bisticci could quite escape. Instead of regarding the position of women exclusively from the point of view of the closed family circle it became more common to allow her to rank as a personality in her own right if she knew how to fend for herself, to impress by her beauty, grace and erudition. It is characteristic that the con-

cept of the dignity of the woman of poise made its way in the middle class which likes to be impressed (2).

In the new society gathered around the new court which had arisen in opposition to all legitimacy and tradition, the courtesan herself was admitted and even became a leader of fashion. In times which were breaking away from the concept of the community, when all manifestations of life were gaining independence, love itself was bound to become an "autonomous", "liberal art", a law unto itself and its own fulfilment (Sombart); *ars amandi*, the product of a late civilization, arose again in a period sociologically corresponding to the same stage of classical antiquity. Together with this there came a social cleavage among the courtesans themselves. The "leaders" in the "art", the talented and polished *cortesane famose* differentiated themselves from the *cortesane de la minore sorte*; they became the élite, the "upper class" of harlotry. This differentiation arose at court and in the Metropolis, at Rome, Florence or Venice. On the other hand, Castiglione preserved the ideal of gallantry, linking up with an older chivalrous tradition; here the "lady" again ousted the courtesan, and there were smaller courts, such as Mantua, Ferrara, Urbino, where the prince's wife was the centre of attraction. In Castiglione's *Cortegiano* the prince's sister-in-law was equally able to lead the conversation of the *salon*.

Thus, though the intellectual independence and personal culture of women was the product of humanist erudition, it was only in the atmosphere of the court that she could have a dominant cultural influence. In these surroundings and in an epoch of re-consolidation, of the feudalization of the *haute bourgeoisie* and of increasing romantic tendencies within humanism, the influence of the great lady, of the princess was bound to help along a renaissance of chivalry, as a formal social ideal of cultured living. At this juncture the educative rôle of the lady was of course much more conscious and active than in the natural growth of chivalrous culture around 1200 A.D.; chivalry itself had by now become a "work of art", and woman as a free personality played a decisive part in its creation. She shaped the society and breeding of the court, educating it to a new ideal of courtly manners and personal culture, uniting humanist with chivalrous traits. The new social and aesthetic ideal type of the courtier

(*cortegiano*) shows us the new kind of knight : a man of the world and cultured in every respect, he was the finished *seigneur* of urbane culture. He had to be practised in riding, fencing and tilting as well as to be familiar with the fashionable Platonism ; he had to be a connoisseur and possess a universal culture. But he must do all this with ease (*sprezzatura*), without boasting and with natural superiority : this was still *virtù*, but the effortless *virtù* of a *seigneur*. The court demanded taste and dignity and, especially from its women, elegance. The women created a well-bred society, incorporating grace of manners and a sense of beauty in its life. The revival of chivalry naturally also brought with it a renewal of the courteous service of women. A romance of this revival sang of "*le donne, i cavalier, l'arme, gli amori, le cortesie*", all the "*cose belle*" (Ariosto), the ornaments of a life which had returned to the aristocratic seclusion and exclusiveness of the closed society of a princely court.

So the tradition of the "good" family, for which there is no substitute, became prominent again, and it is not surprising that according to Castiglione the courtier must be of noble birth. The aesthetic achievements of the Renaissance were combined with the social rehabilitation of older elements, and the courts blended new culture with old feudality.

By its very nature a court can never dispense with an aristocracy, it can never be composed of bourgeois elements representative of money capital and the intelligentsia. So, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the court influence brought about a revival of the nobility. But, "up to the first half of the sixteenth century there was a definite bourgeois strain in the behaviour of the aristocracy" (v. Bezold). At the same time the converse already obtained ; the outlook of the nobility was exerting an increasing influence upon the bourgeoisie. Higher society was inevitably falling under aristocratic influence. This expressed itself not only in the acceptance of courtly manners, but noble descent itself was accorded a new high valuation. The humanists had barely stopped repeating the rigmarole of the unimportance of birth, of the exclusive importance of talent, and already we find the monarchical humanism of a Count Castiglione according a semi-divine rôle to the prince which already foreshadowed the Baroque period, and irrationally accepting the "Noble" as the source of everything great ;

nobilità was to him an incomprehensible natural force. The hereditary prince was, again, surrounding himself with noblemen whose duty it was to counsel and to fight. Their prime rôle was that of officials with a legal training; thus the new absolutism created a new function for its nobility. But though it gave an opportunity of advancement to the nobility, their entrance into their vocation demanded special learning, and the doctorate brought with it the "*noblesse de robe*"; so the exclusive importance of noble birth remained diminished, especially as humanist erudition had become one of the indispensable qualifications of the diplomat and of the state official.

In this situation there were again valid standards and conventions. The development had led from the early bourgeois individualism and its ideal of freedom, to the full bourgeois ideal of harmony and thence to the courtly and chivalrous conventionalities of a new norm which looked back to the old mediaeval chivalry. Thus in 1390 there was no prevalent fashion of masculine dress at Florence "because everyone wanted to bear himself in his own particular way" (Burckhardt), but Giovanni della Casa saw fit to warn men of everything striking and of all deviations from the current fashion. From the particularism and originality of the Early Renaissance the new ideal of man as a work of art had led to the classical ideal of the *uomo universale* of the Full Renaissance and to the later ideal of the impeccable cavalier, who deliberately took his place in a closely circumscribed society. Form and dignity were the aim of the new education for princes (cf. Pontano); the ruler must suppress all emotion. This ideal also found expression in new artistic styles: they were distinguished, restrained, measured and magnificent to the point of mannerism. The new ideals were "*grandezza e maestà*" which Lomazzo once again found in classic antiquity, or, as Castiglione had it, "*gravità riposata*"; Spanish influences were gaining ground, and calmness assumed the meaning of greatness and importance.

The sense for great forms and the imposing gesture triumphed completely over all bourgeois characteristics. Castiglione declared that he who performed a great deed for the sake of gain deserved to be dubbed a "*vilissimo mercante*". The new ethics depended upon the emphasis on the political as opposed to the economic urge and on a humanist *vita activa* as opposed to the *vita*

speculativa. This development was carried by the humanist as official of the Prince (e.g. Pontano) and by the belief that politics provided the one career which befitted a man of importance. Again, in the manner of Aristotle a "division of labour" between rulers and ruled was assumed, and the desire to be among the former was openly avowed. "*Est magnanimi proprium (magnanimitas was now the ideal of the élite) nolle obligari, nemini debere, nulli esse addictum, quin devincire sibi ipsi alios potius subicere conferendis operis ac beneficiis.*" A new feudal mode of thought, distinctly uneconomic and anti-bourgeois, exalted noble munificence which should not be limited by pusillanimous calculating. Wastefulness was regarded as preferable to avarice, for the one was the vice of a great, the other of a small spirit. Here humanist and aristocratic ethics met, as they were interested in material goods only for the use to which they could be put. Whereas Alberti still saw (bourgeois) dignity in work and business, they were now again despised. Wealth was of course still praised, but the *magnanimus* was only required to be economical so that he might preserve his independence, to enjoy noble pleasures and dispense noble munificence. The provision of the necessary means was put into the category "*de ratione accipiendi*", and the seigneur himself did not despise *lucra commoda*. A certain bourgeois element of measuring and weighing reason, of wise circumspection and sober consideration of gain entered into the new sense for measure, restraint and dignity. Free of every extreme and emotion, it valued above all the methodical control of passion by reason. This was now the meaning of *humanitas* and nobody appeared more fitted to represent it than he whom a noble birth and a sense of honour naturally picked out for great deeds (*magna facere*). He was born to give to *humanitas* its highest and most perfect expression. Humanism contributed the systematic development of self-control, as being the most important quality of him who controls others. *Sapientia* and *eloquentia* served only to form the complete man. The ideal type of the ruler showed itself as the *homo politicus* of humanist education, bred in the most polished forms of urban culture. The Renaissance was giving way to the Baroque.

III

RENAISSANCE SOCIETY AND ~~THE~~ CHURCH

This new authoritarian civilization signified the stabilization of society, of the state, of culture, and of the style of life. The fermentation and chaos of a bourgeois civilization which unleashed new forces but also brought with it a thoroughgoing disintegration, had made way for a new compulsion, new ties, new authorities. Thus the moment had come for a new stabilization of the Church as well, for the Counter-Reformation. But stabilization always requires artificial interference, an attempt to counteract an already advanced "inflation" of spiritual values. Religious and moral values had almost ceased to be worth the paper that they were written on in an age when economic, intellectual and aesthetic ones alone counted. But if they were again compulsorily put into circulation, a completely new structure would emerge instead of a new edition of the Middle Ages. That would have been as impossible in an age of absolutism and its society, as was a genuine revival of knight-hood in anything but its outward forms. The Renaissance had questioned too many accepted standards; now excessive inquisitiveness was forbidden. But though the questioners could temporarily be silenced, the questions themselves remained unanswered and hence were not forgotten. The intellect had again become static, but by itself that did not suffice to peg down everything. The static of an unshakable religious conviction, peculiar to the earlier Middle Ages of the Romanesque period, had already been modified in the Gothic era. The Renaissance carried the process to the point of complete dissolution. With the belief in God disappeared the strongest shackles as well as the safest footholds. In a society which had emancipated itself from all tradition, recognizing but the liberal powers of money and intellect, morality decayed; luxury destroyed the previous simplicity of bourgeois life (which had prevailed in Florence well into the thirteenth century), and the lack of standards in politics and business with the attendant illegitimacy

of power based only upon individual strength and ability, shook even the firmest foundations.

(a) *THE ALLIANCE OF THE CHURCH WITH THE NEW POWERS*

The Church itself played a prominent part in the destruction of the old order. Had it not been the one rational organization of the Middle Ages? It alone had been a centralized power at that time, whereas the state only attained to such a structure when territorial feudalism made way for absolutist bureaucracy. So the Church was first to read the signs of the emerging money economy. Already in the Middle Ages it had been the most conscious representative of power upheld by rational means, and thus it also saw that money is the first need of a great centralized machinery of administration. This need for money, arising from the nature of this power, it satisfied by a capitalistic finance determined by the period. Next to the modern state, the Church was the "driving force" in the "disintegration" of the mediaeval economic order (Cl. Bauer). The old economic forms were definitely broken down by its adoption of a completely rational mercantilist and monopolistic financial system. Together with Florence the Curia became the first home of exact and business-like calculation and of methodical accounting: papal finance became the pacemaker of Renaissance capitalism and the Apostolic Chancery the *mater pecuniarum*. Only the full exploitation of a money and credit economy made it possible for the Church to secure that position of material power which it held during the Renaissance.

Of course, this economic orientation of the organization as such was bound to have its effect upon the social estate concerned in it. As the aristocracy went bourgeois, the clergy became increasingly secular in outlook; both were entering into the atmosphere of the new period. But the process was less painful for the clergy than for the nobility. Already the early Middle Ages provide examples of clerical greed for money, in which a ruthless desire for gain rode roughshod over every Christian principle. In the sixth and seventh centuries, churches were built in Spain as a speculative investment in the expectation of alms and endowments (Synod of Braga, 572 A.D.) and in 887 Bishop Athanasius of Naples entered into partnership

with the Saracens, securing for himself a share in the profits of the plundering expeditions which they were to undertake under his protection. It is also well known how important the sale of ecclesiastical preferments was at the height of the Middle Ages. Alberti said that "as everyone knows, all priests are in the highest degree greedy for money", and in Renaissance Rome nothing could not be had for money.

In the struggle against the Teutonic feudal domination too, the Papal Curia and the urban bourgeoisie had been allies against the "barbarians". As the Church was forced to regard as its enemy a "universal" imperialism, the result was a kind of Italian national bond which again revived as an anti-Spanish feeling towards the end of the Renaissance. Above all, bourgeois Florence had such a (Guelf) alliance against the Ghibelline powers: the Emperor and the nobility.

Of course, the Florentine *haute bourgeoisie* was no less "enlightened" than Frederick II's court at Palermo. In both circles completely rational, unreligious and sceptical modes of thought prevailed, only the type of culture with which the absolute monarch surrounded himself still preserved a certain esoteric character. The "democratic" spirit of the town and its much more narrow circumstances demanded a comparatively great respect for the attitude of the lower middle class, which as yet was under the tutelage of the Church. The value of religion for furthering its interests and its rational use as a counter in the game of internal and external politics was well understood by the *haute bourgeoisie*.

In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries there still were relations between the bourgeoisie and heresy, as both, though for different reasons, formed a common front against the temporalities of the Church. But after the middle of the thirteenth century, after the bourgeoisie had become completely dominant in the Italian Communes, it took an unequivocal stand against heresy. The bourgeois mentality now stood opposed to all extremists and favoured accommodation to and co-operation with ecclesiastical power; it was convenient for political and above all economic and financial reasons, just as it was convenient to keep the people religious and to use orthodoxy to control the masses, the *vulgar*, while living in "amiable scepticism" (G. Volpe) oneself. The bourgeoisie kept for itself the

"higher" culture of its typical aesthetic, intellectual and spiritual interests, whose ideal was provided by a thoroughly secular, "humanist" interpretation of Classical Antiquity. Thus it demanded for itself an intellectual freedom which it denied to the lower classes. These, for their part, where they did not as a typical middle class follow the traditionalist lead of the dominant groups, but felt themselves oppressed, took a proletarian ideal of equality from the primitive Church; more exposed to mystic excitement than the sober bourgeoisie, they developed heretical tendencies. The *Ciampi* were the direct descendants of the *Fraticelli* (G. Volpe). In face of this threat to established conditions from the malcontents, the bourgeoisie, as the champions of order, stood together with the Church. Those groups against which the Church helped to establish the bourgeois order, the aristocracy and the *plebs*, were forced into a rôle of social and religious opposition, and at times marched together under the banner of heresy (1). But this alliance of parts of the declining feudal nobility with the lower classes, this contact between the "left wing" and the "right wing" opposition, was no more than a superficial and temporary phenomenon and lacked a genuine religious basis and thus inner reality. Heresy could genuinely originate only among the lowest classes (2), who in their misery had a real and direct realization of a need for salvation. If in due course they found sympathizers among a heretical movement in the aristocracy, the reasons were purely political and only led to the eclipse of the religious idea. As a class the aristocracy now came to terms with the bourgeoisie, accepting its policy, including its specific policy towards the Church.

As the bourgeois interest in the Church had become predominantly political, so on the side of the Curia political and economic considerations became decisive. The financial needs of Rome were responsible for the new and essentially unmediaeval "combination of Pope and merchant" (Gottlob), who made the Papacy into the protector and even partner of those whom mediaeval business ethics had stigmatized as usurers. On the political side the Renaissance Popes regarded themselves as Italian *signori* and the Curia became a great court. Nepotism became the Papal equivalent of dynasticism and the Church disposed over *condottieri* and an enormous bureaucracy. The colossal

Papal revenue provided the money that made Rome into a centre of culture, and the need for prestige and splendour was responsible for a magnificent architecture ; Popes became great patrons of art and in Aeneas Sylvius (Pius II) an adroit and elegant *littérateur* mounted the Fisherman's Chair.

So even the Curia shed its " prejudices " : individual *virtus* alone counted and the " liberal " principle triumphed over traditional conservatism. "*Decus virtutum naturae maculam abstergit in filiis*" : thus a Papal Bull of 1493, legitimizing a natural-born child. In the same manner as the despots, the prelates accepted their mistresses and the Popes the famous courtesans into the society of their courts. Even on this point freedom from tradition was carried to such lengths ; the Church was marching with the times, was in fact leading the way. A great deal of the pornographic literature of the day came from clerical pens.

In the Middle Ages the clergy had been socially and intellectually privileged ; by now it was part of a general movement whose course was determined by the laity. As humanists, poets or artists, clerics too became representatives of the new culture.

It was a clerical upper class which was striking this alliance with the powers of form and beauty, recognizing in them the new mighty means of creating a visible impression of greatness. It was its aim to procure a hold over the " people " and at the same time to keep itself as a race apart, to hold at arm's length the clerical lower class, that is to say, in the main, the Mendicants. These still remained a democratic, middle-class element characterized by the transition from the late Middle Ages to the Early Renaissance. They propagated a popular piety, which found naïve and unsophisticated expression in the naturalist and occasionally " vulgar " intimate middle-class art of the Early Renaissance, for instance in its representations of the Madonna. The art of the Full Renaissance was a reaction away from this too close approach of heaven to earth. Its social equivalent implied a new desire for distance and respect which was to apply to spiritual matters as well as to the higher clergy, after the " cheapening " effect that the Mendicants, who hobnobbed with the people upon equal terms, had had. The attitude of the *bon bourgeois* was replaced by an unapproachable solemnity. On the one side an immediate, if somewhat crude piety, expressed by an art which came from below, on the other a careful elimina-

tion of everything profane, corresponding to a no longer spontaneous piety, but to a religiousness cultivated from above. It was an art which no longer grew from genuine religious motives, and thus all the more clearly shows social and ecclesiastical traits: the deliberate intention to bring about certain religious effects. The secular and ecclesiastical upper classes united to reverse the democratic developments, and the new desire for exclusive differentiation took them from the Full Renaissance to the Baroque of the Counter-Reformation.

The worldly Church of the Renaissance which made the alliance with the ruling bourgeoisie and to a great extent assimilated its culture clearly shows that "compromise" with the "world" of which, according to Troeltsch, the "Ecclesiastical Type" is eminently capable and to which it is prone. It was the universal Church joining hands with a universal culture. The higher clergy and the educated section of the monks combined with the owners of worldly wealth and the upholders of secular learning, accepting their cultural dictation. Opposed to this ecclesiastical upper class was the purist (or as Fedor Schneider puts it "simplist") monastic type, accepting only the religious, to the exclusion of the cultural idea. It was the type of the Mendicant, ignorant and antagonistic to learning, or at any rate to secular learning, seeing himself as part of the middle class, the "petty bourgeoisie", to which he always held. Its greatest representatives were the preachers of repentance—above all others Savonarola—with their religious austerity, who gave to an otherwise unarmed class the weapon of the "pure" idea; they led it to revolt against the wealthy and sophisticated upper class which, with its "vain poetry and infamous rhetoric", had lost sight of man's greatest need. Along such lines Savonarola created a monkish republic on a democratic basis and was persecuted, branded as a heretic and finally burnt by an irate hierarchy. But such opposition remained within the scope of the Church and within the bourgeoisie: it was the opposition of the only groups which were at that time capable of challenging the established powers. The very lowest class, the proletariat, provided an "external" opposition and was represented in religion by the sectarian type which stood on the "left" even of the monks and which usually was most fervent in its piety. But just as the bourgeoisie was dominant in economic, social and

political affairs, the Church was dominant in religion. It went together with the *haute bourgeoisie*, at the same time using the middle class as a support—just as it used and had to use the monastic type as a religious support. Of course this was not a monasticism which had cut all ties that held it to the world, but as the guardian of theory it was strongly bound by tradition, and slow to adjust itself to the times. It was comparatively static, as was the middle class which maintained the official business ethics of the Church as propounded by the monks. (It must be admitted that the financial practice of the Church was not easily reconciled with its teaching.)

(b) THE ADJUSTMENT OF ECONOMIC ETHICS

Middle-class business ethics (1) was a child of the Middle Ages. Hence it bore the imprint of the narrow conditions of a primary artisan economy, of the mediaeval crafts and of mediaeval commerce. Its theoretical inclination towards the static corresponded to this as well as did its traditionalism, shaped by a conservative community life. Everything in it was limited, "petty bourgeois" in fact; work was sacred but profit was not. Work was held in respect for its moral importance, as though for its own sake, but gain was to be restricted to what was necessary for upkeep, scaled according to social position. This artisan's morality was always distrustful of the merchant. According to Alexander of Hales (2) and St. Bonaventura, both Franciscans, trade which aims at profit (*lucrum*) and the accumulation of wealth (3) was illegitimate; they only recognized trade which was to provide sustenance (*sustentatio*) and for works of charity. They branded as greed worthy of excommunication the storing of goods, especially of necessities, with the intention of using them in speculation. Only a craftlike trade, keeping to the *iustum pretium*, was permitted by them, while rationally managed trade seemed to them sinful. Large-scale commerce they put on a par with usury. The Middle Ages liked to adapt Leo the Great's dictum: "*Difficile est inter ementis vendentisque commercium non intervenire peccatum.*" Within a static order it is easiest to avoid sin, but commercial activity calls for dynamic and for the overthrow of the ecclesiastical theory of a fixed distribution of wealth which is valid for all time. The spirit of enterprise

was pressing beyond the imposed limits, from a narrow static order of "petty bourgeois" artisans to a dynamic order of great capitalists; from the narrow situation of the Middle Ages to the new expanding scope which no longer corresponded to the theories which had been evolved in an earlier state. A bourgeois spirit of economic rationalism could evolve in the artisan's order of things—only a reduction and secularization of Christian into bourgeois morality was needed to make the bourgeois spirit utilitarian and suitable for a capitalist economy—but it did not permit a development of the spirit of enterprise. The mediaeval Church stood for an order based on Estates fitting in with the interest of the middle class which remained faithful to the Church, and desired the maintenance of this rigid system. Thus emerged, at any rate in theory, an opposition between the Church and the individualist entrepreneurs. Any attempt to make unlimited profits was, in the light of ecclesiastical business ethics, a revolt against the established order; it was sinful because it was *inordinatum* or *immoderatum*. For in the great *ordo* of divine institution everyone was assigned a place, everyone was confined within definite limits and every sphere of action was closely circumscribed. Change appeared as "*aliquid imperfectum*" (4), economic steadiness (*perseverantia*) was praiseworthy (5) and even travel was regarded as almost immoral.

But whereas mediaeval economic ethics were decidedly "petty bourgeois" in their attitude towards the process of production, recognizing only very limited aims, the attitude towards consumption did not lack a certain seignorial broadmindedness—for different ways of life for the various Estates were recognized. Bernardino of Siena could still hold that "*quod uni statui decens est, alteri ad vitium reputatur*". While capitalism admits of the unrestricted production and exchange of commodities, its "internal" economy is calculating and as regards expenditure easily becomes cheese-paring. Capitalist mentality thus leaves the door open to certain "petty bourgeois" characteristics, whereas Thomist business ethics condemned "*parvificentia*" as mean avarice. On the other hand, in that system too, the wastrel who respects money too little (*minus debito*) stood condemned (6); but *liberalitas* and *magnificentia* were praised: this meant the display of the Church in the first place, but included other forms too. This ideal was true to the feudal mediaeval

spirit and was again taken up by the Renaissance as it entered its courtly period.

But within the great nexus of ecclesiastical thought there were a number of examples of an incipient rationalism which needed only a loosening of the mediaeval static, in order to serve as the intellectual basis and justification of capitalism. The Church, being a rational organization, had to allow two fundamental principles : in the first place the principle of giving free scope to ability, at any rate within the ranks of the hierarchy, and in the second, a methodical psychological technique, applied to begin with to those who worked within the organization, but soon also to those who were to be organized by it. The use of such a technique was bound to have its effects on the economic as well as on all other spheres of life.

Whatever the actual practice of the mediaeval Church may have been, especially in Germany—"the bishoprics had, in a manner of speaking, become hereditary appanages of the highest aristocracy and admission to the Chapters often required a strict scrutiny of the candidate's ancestry" (Aloys Schulte)—it remained a principle that those of the greatest ability should have access to the highest preferments, without regard to their social origins. That is to say, that in theory ecclesiastical offices were filled on liberal principles. The bourgeois valuation of talent is indispensable to any organization which is rationally adapted to certain ends, as the Church was. The belief that God created all men in his own image, the idea that they all had a soul of infinite value and that in the last resort they were all equal before God, as they were equal in face of death, could not help giving rise to certain egalitarian as well as individualist trends ; these contained the germ of the dissolution of the system of Estates, seeing that differences of rank were in the very last resort unimportant. Representatives of the monastic type, who in contrast to the hierarchy with its worldly tendencies again and again returned to the religious fundamentals, popularized such ideas. The first of these waves began at Cluny, the last produced the Mendicant Orders. Thus the theology and ideology of the Church contained certain democratic and bourgeois aspects, one of which was its rational philosophy which argued in a thoroughly intellectual way. Side by side with the intellect the decisive part was played by a morality which

based on reason and used the doctrine of the Free Will as its first premise. The attempts to bring about a systematic, disciplined and methodical way of life begin with the Rule of St. Benedict and lead, *via* the scholastic moral philosophy, to the bourgeois *ratio* of men like Alberti. The closeness of the relationship becomes clear when we find St. Thomas Aquinas praising circumspection and reason as part of *prudentia* (7) or Antoninus of Florence recognizing time as "*res pretiosissima et irrecuperabilis*" (8), when everywhere reason is preferred to the emotions (9) after the manner of bourgeois Stoic philosophy, and when Antoninus rates the nobles for not deigning to work (10).

Reason automatically paves a way for personal ability. The combination of rational with conservative, static thought constituted a contradiction. Ever since the Fathers, ecclesiastical thought had admitted elements of natural law which conflicted by their very nature with the mediaeval conception of a society divided into Estates; but as long as society itself remained static the conflict was not acute. With the Renaissance a highly dynamic state intervened, which shook the very foundations of mediaeval society. "In stirring times even men of humble origin, as long as they have learnt something, dare hope for a bishopric," thus Aeneas Sylvius. Personal ability, and personal ability alone, gave access to the highest positions, even within a conservative organization such as the ecclesiastical hierarchy. The ideology too had to adjust itself to such changes, at any rate to a certain extent and within the conveniently broad limits of interpretation. The Roman Church has always handled with mastery the method of interpretation as a way of preserving tradition without losing touch with a changing reality. The commentaries upon St. Thomas were the literary device by which an almost unnoticeable though necessary adjustment to the new conditions was achieved. The commentary of Cardinal Cajetano de Vio (*ob.* 1469) broke down the decisive importance of the ("natural") Estates, the static element in the social structure, by recognizing the rôle of (natural) talent; it recognized the right of high personal qualities (*virtutes*) to lift a man from the Estate of his birth, even to the point of allowing him to rule others; it vindicated the right of each to a "*status consonans suae virtuti*" which was his by natural right (*natural aequitate debetur*). The *singulari homines* were given the right o

rising above their Estate : this was *virtuti suae eorum congruum* (11). The objective category of social rank was swept away, to be replaced by the subjective one of personal *virtus*. The individual personality had prevailed, and this was recognized by the theologian, above all in economic matters. The Church now permitted the accumulation of wealth (*cumulare pecunias*). Of course, the limitations imposed by general rules of morality remained, so that a completely unbridled lust for gain was not permitted, but profit as a remuneration for incurred risk was regarded as legitimate.

The psychological approach to economic matters underwent corresponding alterations. A static age could still conceive of man being beyond all economic worries and maintaining his inner peace and independence in face of them : this was an ideal uniting the clerical and aristocratic attitudes. Its ideological expression in St. Thomas's *Summa contra gentiles* was that *sollicitudo mentis* (as distinct from *labor*) for material goods was described as prohibited by Christ. Robert of Lecce (*floruit* 1490) brought home the change of epoch when he described such *sollicitudo* as " *tolerabilis* ", although too much attention (*nimia occupatio*) with trade remained sinful (Bernardino da Busti). But a consciously planned behaviour in business—St. Antoninus condemned aimless drifting as unworthy—was admitted by the ecclesiastical writers, though they thought in terms of the common good, not of unbridled private interests.

In any case the Church underwent a certain rapprochement to the tendencies of capitalism in its economic ethics. The theories of the *haute bourgeoisie* and of the Church united to evolve the concept of the honourable merchant. The Church recognized the right to wealth which had been gained in bourgeois honesty (*onestà*) and success in honest business. According to Bernardino honourably acquired riches were agreeable in the sight of God and Man. The bourgeois writers (Villani, Morelli, Alberti), too, demanded honesty from a merchant. Dominici, a Dominican who became a Cardinal, even recognized a vocation to gain, a destiny to win and preserve wealth. If the Church always required moderation it was met half-way by the " second generation " of capitalists who imposed a limit upon themselves and by their own free will, although they still saw the magnitude of the individual's wealth as an indication of God's blessing

(e.g. Morelli). It must of course be understood that considerations of security rather than economic scruples were responsible for the new moderation of the bourgeoisie. Thus, a compromise was reached: the Church accorded a measure of legitimacy to the new dynamic, while on the other hand capitalism itself abandoned its most virulent manifestations and returned to a qualified static.

Above all, banking required a benevolent latitude in the interpretation of the canonical bar against the taking of interest. The social function of this prohibition which stood for traditionalism (Cl. Bauer) was to brand the capitalist intruder as a usurer, in accordance with mediaeval consciousness: the Church, the "traditional guarantor of a collective morality", thus resisted the high-handed expansion of his own business by an intruder which interfered with the traditional divisions of production. As a mass organization the Church must stand for a social morality which takes account of the interests of the average producer. As a result the Church was forced to steer a course which lay in between the requirements of its moral prestige and its financial interests. The ever-increasing need for money and credit forced the Church as a social power, in the same way as it did the absolute state, into a close alliance with those capitalist entrepreneurs who alone were able to satisfy it. In consequence the Church had to make a certain adjustment—in theory as well as practice—between divergent tendencies and interests. In order to maintain its moral prestige with the middle class, a formal prohibition of the taking of interest had to stand, but it was not permissible to draw inconvenient conclusions from that norm. As the Church had to rely upon the new economic upper class to keep its organization functioning, it was forced to come to terms and even enter into close relations with it. Thus indirectly it had to assist the destruction of the old social and economic order and tolerate the new economic ethics. It even had to protect the entrepreneurs actively from the reaction of traditional collective morality. As the Church evolved a new general morality which left a place for the individual desire for gain, it broke down the previous obstacles and removed the stain of social infamy from the rational management of business.

As a result the middle-class elements in the economic ethic of the Church were considerably weakened, but the demands of

capitalism were also somewhat modified in accordance with the need for keeping on good terms with the economic magnates and at the same time maintaining the Church's hold over the middle classes.

(c) *BOURGEOIS CONSERVATISM AND ECCLESIASTICAL TRADITIONALISM*

The *haute bourgeoisie* too is interested in controlling the masses from above. It too needs a lasting order, a security from revolution, in order to maintain its position. In consequence there were already at an early date (cf. Villani) conservative traits in the political interests of the bourgeoisie. Here we come to the sociological meaning of the continued alliance with the Church. To a greater or less extent the idea of the Church had lost its mediaeval immediacy, and hence its religious efficacy, among the *haute bourgeoisie*, who even dispensed with considerations of justice when they clashed with their power interests. But the maintaining of a traditional deference to the Church—though it was mainly conventional and no longer genuinely religious—was calculated to prevent revolutionary disturbances among the lower classes and to uphold the newly crystallized static.

The Church still retained an immense power which must not be left out of account and might be used to good purpose. Consciously therefore, the ecclesiastical frame was maintained. The continued piety of the people was useful, and to keep them religious the attempt was made to convince them of the piety of their rulers. When unobserved by the masses the bourgeoisie actually elevated this deception into a political principle. Pontano, both politician and satirist, taught how to "use superstition to lead the people" and to keep the subjects patiently obedient towards authority. In this instance the mode of thought of the Renaissance had already come near that of the absolute state.

Naturally even the upper class maintained vestiges of religious feeling—perhaps a "residue of the fear of hell-fire among the great sinners" (Burckhardt). "Pious foundations" were made not only for reasons of personal glory but also to "be on the safe side" just in case the soul were immortal after all, as Niccolo Acciajuoli put it. The religious feeling of the Renais-

sance was certainly anti-clerical, but the age was not primarily anti-religious at all, and its material life was strongly linked up with the Church. In addition, the splendour of the ritual gave much pleasure, as did all remainders of paganism in the Catholic Church. After all, it was possible to survive as an "open unbeliever, if one refrained from all direct hostility to the Church" (Burckhardt). Again, despite all its love of satire and sarcasm and its joy in impertinence, the intelligentsia had no urge towards systematic enlightenment or a manifest separation from the Church. Definite limits were quite consciously observed, though they were drawn as widely as was possible: all attacks upon the Church as an institution were eschewed. As long as he observed that measure of circumspection, even a man like Valla could have an appointment in the Curia. The protection and patronage of the Church were too valuable to be despised. Renaissance society aimed no more at an intellectual than at a political revolution; its ideological needs were predominantly aesthetic. They were satisfied by that Platonism of the *salons* which was a sociological rather than an intellectual manifestation: it remained the eternal subject of conversation, purely a matter of taste which imposed no obligations upon a refined society of *beaux esprits*. The poetry of Lorenzo de' Medici and the Dialogues of Castiglione and Bembo are much more characteristic than the weighty tomes of Ficino. Even where something more than mere aestheticism was involved, a deep contradiction remained between the free philosophy and the esoteric private religion of an educated élite on the one hand and the popular religion, the official Catholicism of men like Bisticci on the other. This secret antinomy between two religions corresponded—as in the parallel civilization of late Antiquity—to the division of society into an educated and an uneducated section. It also corresponds to the modern separation of the "spiritual" from the vital, the material and the sensual, which superseded their close interlinkage of the Middle Ages. At that time even the different elements in the current philosophy formed a "community". But the Renaissance saw the modern segregation of the "pure" mind, which an intellectual upper class, a bourgeois intelligentsia such as the humanists claim as its own preserve.

The Middle Ages had also known how to reconcile the con-

cepts of Free Will and of Divine Grace in a practical semi-Pelagianism. But the rationalism of capitalists and humanists gave an absolute position to human *virtus*: man can achieve everything by his own power. The doctrine of the "dignity of man" (Pico della Mirandola) was inflated until it became a conviction of equality with God. It was this ideology, typical of an upper class conscious of the safety of its own intellectual and economic power position, this rationalism unknown to the Middle Ages, that in its turn originated a form of irrationalism which had been equally unknown to them; it is exemplified in Luther's teaching of the *servum arbitrium*, of salvation by faith alone. This ideological reaction went hand in hand with a social reaction from below against the worldly Church which was linked to the upper class. The proletariat, in a typical reaction, turned to Sectarianism and was suppressed by the stronger secular and spiritual powers. The middle class, itself without political power and of passive inclination, was prepared for any kind of compromise, social as well as religious. It was ready to submit to absolutism as well as to its creature, a Church typified by Erastian Protestantism. What form the reaction against the economic upper class took is shown by the attitude of the Reformation towards capitalism. Luther, a peasant's son, thought that it would be "godly to increase tillage and to diminish commerce". The middle-class public opinion which stood behind the Reformation was determined by the interests of the primary producer and the artisan, who were both to some extent idealized. It was thus reactionary by comparison with the capitalist modes of thought (which the people also partially adopted by allowing themselves to be impressed by them) of the Renaissance. The judgment that the Reformation, above all in Germany, passed upon the repercussions that capitalism had produced upon ethics are significant in this connection. The classes which were still closely related to the Middle Ages reasserted themselves here. It is for such reasons that Troeltsch, basing his view mainly upon cultural considerations, reckons Luther as predominantly "mediaeval". Even Calvinism showed a distinct anti-capitalist bias up to the seventeenth century (1). The puritan preachers shared the attitude of the peasant and artisan, for that kind of outlook provided "a much more suitable background for their anti-worldly teaching" (Sombart).

Of course, Puritanism finally accepted the bourgeois way of life as compatible with a State of Grace ; but this was not in accordance with its original spirit, was an adjustment dictated by prevailing economic conditions analogous to similar adjustments of Catholic economic ethics. In the last resort and inasmuch as they were able to make an impression upon economic ethics, both Catholicism and Protestantism imposed ties and moderated the urge for gain during the period of Early Capitalism. But whereas the Catholic Church, like the absolute state, practically went hand in hand with the monetary powers and gave decisive support to capitalist developments (this has been best demonstrated by Strieder's researches), Protestantism, the reaction from the worldly-inclined Church of the Renaissance and the return of a predominantly spiritual religion, showed greater unconcern towards material things. To begin with, Protestantism was "in every respect a grave danger to the spirit of capitalism" (Sombart). In religion as well as socially, by virtue of the interdependence of these two fields, the Reformation and, in a different sense, the Counter-Reformation were a reaction after the Renaissance. This reaction was the conclusion to that prelude of modern times which was only continued by the Age of Reason.

But that prelude already gives us in fragmentary and concentrated form all those *leitmotifs* which received development and multifarious variation at the hand of a later age of which our own day remains a part. Prominent aspects of the modern situation can be recognized, though in a different guise, during that earlier period. In the simpler forms of the early days of bourgeois civilization they confront us in a more striking and convincing form than in the complicated and often confusing picture of the present day.

NOTES

PREFACE

- (1) F. ENGEL JÁNOSI : *Soziale Probleme der Renaissance* (Beihefte zur Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte. 4 ; 1924).
- (2) M. F. SCHELER : *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft*.

INTRODUCTION

- (1) cf. VESPASIANO DA BISTICCI : *Vite di uomini illustri* and the author's contribution to *Festschrift für H. Finke*.
- (2) PÖHLMANN : *Wirtschaftspolitik der Florentiner Renaissance*.

THE NEW DYNAMIC

(a) CHANGES IN SOCIAL STRUCTURE

- (1) cf. E. MEHL : *Die Weltanschauung des Giovanni Villani* in W. GOETZ : *Beiträge zur Kultur- und Universalgeschichte* ; also the author's critique in *Historische Zeitschrift*, vol. 142 ("Zur kultursociologischen Problematik der Gegenwart").
- (2) DAVIDSOHN : *Forschungen zur Geschichte von Florenz*.

(b) THE NEW INDIVIDUALIST ENTREPRENEUR

- (1) cf. ALBERTI : *Della famiglia* (ed. Mancini), p. 137 : "*crescendo in noi colle faccende insieme industria et opera*".

(c) NEW MODES OF THOUGHT

- (1) cf. KAUTSKY : "The further production and exchange of commodities developed, the more the social powers eluded the understanding of men and the less intelligible did the social relations become."
- (2) DARU : *Histoire de la République de Venise*, II, 411.
- (3) The more rapid turnover of all things found expression in the phenomenon of quickly changing fashions ; this also speaks for the increased influence of women in society.
- (4) VESPASIANO DA BISTICCI, ed. Frati, I, 249.
- (5) cf. FUETER : *Geschichte der neueren Historiographie*, for an account of the completely sceptical approach to history by the humanists, which had eliminated all belief in miracles.

(e) NEW WAYS IN ART

- (1) DEHIO : *Geschichte der deutschen Kunst*, II, 167 f.
- (2) *Erinnerungsgabe für Max Weber*.

(f) FUNCTIONS OF ERUDITION AND LEARNING

- (1) cf. HERMANN REUTER, *Die religiöse Aufklärung im Mittelalter*, ed. Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa*, vol. II; FR. V. BEZOLD, *Das Fortleben der antiken Götter im mittelalterlichen Humanismus*, etc.
- (2) cf. Salutati's polemic against Poggio concerned with the pre-eminence of Petrarca and Boccaccio over Classical Antiquity (also the author's *Col. Salutati und das humanistische Lebensideal*, 1916); also LEON BRUNI, *De tribus vitiis* and Alberti's appreciation of Brunelleschi and Donatello in *Della pittura*.

(g) THE PROPRIETED CLASSES AND THE INTELLIGENTSIA

- (1) cf. *supra*, p. 14.
- (2) cf. VESPASIANO DA BISTICCI.
- (3) cf. H. Baron in his edition of Bruni.
- (4) "Si mulier mihi et ego mulieri placeo, quid tu tamquam medius nos dirimere conaberis?" *De voluptate*, I, cap. 38, "omnino nihil interest, utrum cum marito coeat mulier an cum amatore—"
- (5) On Galatco cf. Burkhardt in the second volume.
- (6) From *de Nobilitate*.
- (7) Valla recounts this about Panormita's address to the Genoese on the occasion of an embassy from Milan.

THE CURVE OF DEVELOPMENT

(a) RISK AND THE SPIRIT OF ENTERPRISE

- (1) At the same time jealousy between the Estates disappeared, at any rate on the side of the aristocracy. Otherwise, there could have been no *Paradiso degli Alberti*, towards the end of the fourteenth century. That the feeling was kept alive for a long time on the bourgeois side is proved by the violence it assumed in L. B. Alberti, himself a *déclassé* noble of the fifteenth century. Perhaps, though, his aristocratic origin tended to heighten his resentment.
- (2) cf. *infra*, p. 85.

(b) THE CULTURE OF THE NEW RULING CLASSES: THE NEW STATIC AND BOURGEOIS CONSERVATISM

- (1) cit. DOREN: *Italienische Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, I, 417.
- (2) cf. *supra*, p. 13.

(c) HUMANISM: ROMANTICISM AND RESTORATION

- (1) cf. O. CARTELLIERI, *The Court of Burgundy*, and HUIZINGA, *Waning of the Middle Ages*.
- (2) cf. the author's article "Petrarca und die Romantik der Renaissance" in *Historische Zeitschrift*, vol. 138.

- (3) Already Bruni saw fit to defend the humanists against complaints that they were devoting themselves exclusively to the past. Cf. Baron's edition, p. 122.
- (4) Against this type of humanism there was to be determined opposition from the "realist" wing, especially where the ideals and programme of education of an exclusive intelligentsia of scholars were concerned, which was most calculated to propagate such ideas.
- (5) *De remediis*, I, 59.
- (6) *De remediis*, I, 68.
- (7) "*Alii se ad bella accingunt, tu otium non relinquis, si modo utilius est . . . Illi se mari committunt, tu e litore securis oculis irrideas fluctus seu potius fluctantes. Hi propter lucra dies noctibus fatigando jungunt, tu fruiere quietus porto*" (Valla).
- (8) *Inferno*, XVI, 73 ff.

(d) THE ART OF THE FULL RENAISSANCE

- (1) A practical man of action will reject such an ideal. Cf. Bismarck's "Why should I be a harmonious personality?"
- (2) Catholicism, even in its Franciscan and Thomist forms, always had to contrast the harmony of the beyond with the tensions in the world, due to Original Sin.
- (3) "Its works are visible to all and the impression that they leave is most easily transferred to the universal consciousness"; and again, "Building needs co-operation" and the completion of the task "expresses the desire of the multitude" (Dehio).

(e) THE DECADENCE OF THE BOURGEOISIE AND THE CALL FOR DICTATORSHIP

- (1) Thus Machiavelli in the *Asino d'Oro*.
- (2) cf. *supra*, pp. 48 f.
- (3) Sombart in his explanation of this particular instance also assumes that Alberti's "noble blood was diluted" by way of his mother. (He was born out of wedlock.)
- (4) *Discorsi*, I, 55, 220.
- (5) *Arte della guerra*, VII, 52, 67.

(f) THE COURTS

- (1) SAITSCHICK: *Menschen und Kunst der Italienischen Renaissance*, pp. 185 f.
- (2) cf. *supra*, pp. 14 f.

RENAISSANCE SOCIETY AND THE CHURCH

(a) THE ALLIANCE OF THE CHURCH WITH THE NEW POWERS

- (1) "*Nobile ed eretico diventano ora parole sinonime*" (Volpe).
- (2) Even at the beginning of the sixteenth century a Florentine Chronicler

expressly relates that the members of a newly formed sect were "*homini di popolo e di baxa conditione.*" Quoted in PASTOR, *History of the Popes from the Close of the Middle Ages* (Ed. Antrobus.)

(b) *THE ADJUSTMENT OF ECONOMIC ETHICS*

- (1) If, with Clemens Bauer, we distinguish between *Wirtschaftsethos* (the customary norms and valuations and the general motives which determine actual economic practice) and *Wirtschaftsethik* (a theory, the statement of what ought to be), it should be clear that theory will always lag a little behind practice and that the time lag will become considerable in times of fundamental change. On the other hand theory must always attempt to make good this time lag so as not to lose contact with reality, which would be fatal to its efficacy.
- (2) *Summa* (ed. 1516), P. III, qu. 50, m. I.
- (3) "*ut . . . pecunias congregent et divitias acquirant.*"
- (4) MICHAEL DE MEDIOLANO, *Sermones Quadragesimales*.
- (5) Contrast Petrarca's typical polemic against the static interpretation of the ideals of *perseverantia* and *constantia* (Fam. XV, 321 f.): "*si quis . . . immobilitatem constantiam vocet valde illi podagrici constantes videri debent; sed constantiores mortui*"!
- (6) *St. Antonini Summa moralis*, II, 6, 8, § 1.
- (7) cf. S. THOMAS, IIa, IIae, qu. 49, 53, 123 ff.
- (8) *Summa moralis*, II, 9, 2, § 2.
- (9) "*Timor Dei excitat hominem ad actum rationis, . . . quia timor facit homines consiliativos*", St. Thomas and Antoninus.
- (10) *Summa moralis*, II, 1, 2, § 6.
- (11) *Commentarium ad S. Thom. Summ. theol.*, IIa, IIae, qu. 118, a. 1.

(c) *BOURGEOIS CONSERVATISM AND ECCLESIASTICAL TRADITIONALISM*

- (1) For a statement of the case against Max Weber (*The Protestant Ethic*) cf. Karl Holl.

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